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On the cover: Multinational military service members, humanitarian aid organization workers, and rescue and medical personnel unload casualties from an Indian military helicopter to a joint Task Force 505 medical triage area at Tribhuvan International Airport, Kathmandu, Nepal. Photo by Gunnery Sgt. Ricardo Morales/III MEF Combat Camera

In Every Issue

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This issue of the Liaison is focused on emerging challenges to civil-military coordination in disaster response. You will see that the articles are written by leaders in their field—humanitarians, military leaders, academicians, and partner organizations—to provide a balanced perspective for a way ahead, which maximizes the strengths of both communities.

Articles include a first-glance at challenges and innovative coordination mechanisms faced in response to the April earthquake in Nepal. Another article highlights how domestic lessons learned can be leveraged in international responses as a way to better prepare our partners to overcome the "tyranny of distance." This can be mitigated to a degree through joint exercises, training, and familiarization with international guidelines on the use of military and civil defense assets (MCDAs) in disaster relief operations. Furthermore, the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) looks at early considerations on civil-military responses to emerging diseases. This is indicative of how military dialogue that this publication seeks to enhance.

CFE-DMHA has focused its efforts in the past year on the delivery of expertise in training and education, information sharing, and regional civil-military engagements. This is done in coordination with partner organizations such as UNOCHA’s Civil-Military Coordination Section, while remaining posture to support U.S. Pacific Command in planning and response to natural disasters involving U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific.

The Center would like to thank all of our contributors to this issue. Your insights enrich a diverse civil-military dialogue that this publication seeks to enhance.

We will soon begin work on the next issue of the Liaison. The theme will be "Lessons from Nepal and Other Recent Disasters," to be published in Spring 2016. Submission ideas will be due in November. We welcome your comments, contributions and suggestions. Please visit our website at https://www.cfe-dmha.org to learn more about our mission, partnership and training opportunities.

LIAISON provides an open forum for stimulating discussion, exchange of ideas and lessons learned both academic and pragmatic—and invites active participation from its readers. If you would like to address issues relevant to the disaster management and humanitarian assistance community, or share a comment or thought on articles from past issues, please submit them to editor@cfe-dmha.org. Please specify which article, author and issue to which you are referring. LIAISON reserves the right to edit letters to the editor for clarity, language and accuracy.
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THE HuM OCC

Typhoon Haiyan, Cyclone Pam and Nepal Earthquake: Observations and Lessons Identified in Humanitarian-Military-Police Coordination and the Use of Foreign Military Assets

By Ronaldo Reario, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Training and Partnership Unit, Civil-Military Coordination Section, Emergency Services Branch, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Military assets have been increasingly involved in humanitarian response operations in recent large-scale natural disasters. They are particularly evident where affected states request, welcome or accept international assistance, including foreign military assets (FMA). Humanitarian organisations on the ground inevitably interacted with them. This trend creates significant coordination needs in terms of optimising the use of available military assets to support priority humanitarian requirements. These may include capacity gaps in the realm of logistics (transport, air and seaport management, warehousing, commercial transport information, etc.), medical/health (out-patient and in-patient capacity, disease surveillance, public health interventions, etc.), communications (satellite-based voice and data), information management (assessment information, priorities in terms of goods-services-locations, potential gaps within estimated timeframes), and other operational issues that impinge the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The “Three Big Ones” in the Asia-Pacific Region

On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda) made landfall in the Philippines. It was one of the strongest and deadliest typhoons in recorded history. The scale and magnitude of the impact of Typhoon Haiyan created overwhelming need in the hardest-hit areas. On the ninth of November 2013, the government of the Philippines accepted the U.N. offer of international assistance and welcomed the deployment of FMA. Twenty-two Member States deployed FMA in the Philippines. However, only 12 stationed assets and deployed “boots on the ground” consisting of various air, sea, medical, engineering, communication assets and personnel.

On 13 March 2015, Cyclone Pam hit Vanuatu creating widespread damage to property and sources of livelihood. Cyclone Pam is considered as one of the worst national natural disasters in the history of Vanuatu. On 14 March 2015, the Government of Vanuatu accepted offers of international assistance and welcomed the deployment...
A Nepal Police soldier reads a newspaper article on the 7.3-magnitude aftershock that struck just weeks after a 7.8-magnitude earthquake hit Nepal’s capital of Kathmandu on 30 April 2015, the second in the space of two-weeks. The earthquake, which struck just weeks after a 7.8-magnitude earthquake hit Nepal’s capital of Kathmandu on 25 April 2015, had the following implications:

1. A hinderer factor identified was the different decision-making processes among the key players from national and local governments, as well as the different priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a 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process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of priorities and a corresponding vetting process in terms of pri
in Gorkha and Chautara. Following this decision, dedicated UN-CMCoord officers were deployed in each of the humanitarian hubs.

The Government of Nepal established a Multi-national Military Operations and Coordination Center (MN MCC). The Nepal Army chaired the MNMCC with the participation of foreign military liaison officers from Algeria, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Canada, China, Israel, India, Japan, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, U.K. and the U.S.

UNOCHA was invited by the MNMCC chief to have a permanent liaison function within the MNMCC to facilitate information sharing and coordination, as well as common situational awareness between the MNMCC and the UNDAC Team’s On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC). The Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) was established by the UN-CMCoord team as part of the Nepal Earthquake response operation. It was co-located with the MNMCC. The HuMOCC objective was to provide a predictable humanitarian-military-police coordination platform. Complementary to the OSOCC, the HuMOCC aimed to provide the physical space dedicated to facilitating the interface between humanitarians, national and foreign military actors, as well as the national police.

As of 10 May, an Integrated Planning Cell (IPC) was created within the MNMCC. The primary objective of the IPC was to reinforce the planning and coordination "trading floor" function that is usually activated as part of the standard "MNCC" structure. The following representatives composed the IPC: Nepal Army, WFP Logistics Cluster and UNOCHA. Other actors would take part in the IPC on a case-by-case basis. As a result of the establishment of the HuMOCC and the IPC, a procedure was initiated for the submission of requests for assistance (RFA) coming from humanitarian partners.

As part of the hand-over process, the UN-CMCoord team leader organized a debriefing session with the team members to discuss the UN-CMCoord strategy for Nepal and formulate key recommendations.

Typhoon Haiyan AAR Baseline Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevance of Baseline Recommendations</th>
<th>Cyclone Pam</th>
<th>Nepal Earthquake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Establishment of a predictable humanitarian civil-military coordination mechanism at national level to assist and inform the NDMO and the humanitarian clusters</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A humanitarian civil-military coordination capacity in domestic (national) and international rapid response mechanisms should be institutionalised in order to optimize interaction and interoperability and contribute to the establishment of a common situational awareness</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To deploy TFsA with competent liaison officers who are able to explain available capabilities and limitations as well as to extract valuable information to define priorities. In this respect, it is important to keep the line of communication or coordination simple. In addition, the capabilities and complementary support needed should be determined and it is important to provide geographical, situational and actual information and awareness, Liaison officers should also try to avoid duplication and prevent confusion</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. A co-location strategy for humanitarian civil-military coordination, where appropriate and feasible, should be adopted to understand host nation priorities based on humanitarian needs through open, efficient, fact, transparent sharing of information. A co-location strategy promotes humanitarian civil-military coordination effectiveness and efficiency and enhances deliberate planning. It also enables rapid coordination, cooperation, prioritization and decision-making based on needs. In addition, co-location maintains communication and sharing of information among all stakeholders - actors and key players from national and local government levels, foreign and local NGOs, as well as foreign and national military forces. All of these contribute to having a common situational awareness as the operation progresses and the optimal utilization of unique military capability to support humanitarian priorities</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. An emergency response should include a simple, transparent tracking system in order to keep national and sub-national level informed about military air transport and activity and to contribute to the situational awareness of the humanitarian community. Moreover, a tracking system cannot inform the humanitarian community on movements of relief items; it de-conflicts operations with civil aviation and can directly control ground time of military aircraft</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. It is crucial that foreign military forces and organisations should be self-sustaining during the duration of the mission in terms of transport, fuel, food ration, water sanitation, maintenance and communications so as to not create additional burden on the host local governments and/ or communities</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC) process flow shows how straightforward and simplified the process is, yet flexible enough to be tweaked to adapt to the national coordination structure of the affected state.

As of 16 May, the following foreign military forces were present in the country: Bhutan, Canada, China, India, Japan, Pakistan, U.K. and the U.S. It is expected that most of these forces will be transitioning out from the operation by the end of May 2015. The focus of civil-military coordination will therefore be placed on the dialogue and interaction with the Nepal Army, the Nepal Police and the Armed Police.

Preliminary Lessons Identified

1. One key lesson identified in relation to FMA provided by assisting Member States is that FMA should be offered to the affected state and plugged into the existing national coordination mechanisms. The bilateral allocation of FMA to specific clusters and humanitarian partners posed challenges in the context of the Nepal operations. This modality does not promote the optimal use of FMA to support the broader humanitarian priorities that is beyond one cluster and humanitarian organisations. Discussions about the modality for the request/offer/acceptance of FMA should be an integral part of the country preparedness planning process.

2. Military-military coordination mechanisms such as the MNMCC in the context of the Nepal earthquake response should have the capacity to contribute to achieving common situational awareness, facilitate joint planning and clarify task division. This means that humanitarian priorities are given the first opportunity for the use of FMA in the absence of civilian alternatives during the critical period.

3. Requests for the use of FMA at the sub-national (hub) level were passed through the MNMCC. Decision-making and tasking normally take place in Kathmandu at the MNMCC for tasks that are carried out by FMA stationed at the sub-national (hub) level. This was not seen as a robust mechanism that expedites decision on requests to the MNMCC for tasks that are carried out by FMA stationed at the sub-national (hub) level.

4. Another identified lesson is the limited understanding of the national military forces at the sub-national level about the presence of humanitarian actors and FMA present in the area. This resulted in a minimum level of coordination between the humanitarian actors and FMA on one hand, and the national military on the other hand. It was recommended that a civil-military coordination cell be established at the sub-national level.

Way Forward

Figure 1 validates the Typhoon Haiyan AAR recommendations in two different emergencies. “No two emergencies are the same” is a common phrase we hear from colleagues who have responded to multiple natural disasters. I would add that there will always be constants and variables in every large-scale emergency. The former would be overwhelming humanitarian needs, need for resources and the need for coordination among responding organisations; the latter would be more on the “how much of which is needed by whom, where and when” or “how to get the right assistance to the right people, at the right time, in the most appropriate way.” Let me delve on the “constant” that is the need for humanitarian and military coordination in the context of natural disasters in peacetime. The Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Centre (HuMOCC) offers the predictable platform that can provide the space and a simplified process that adds value to the work of others and also strengthens humanitarian coordination in general.

Perhaps in preparation for the next big natural disaster, the HuMOCC concept can be incorporated in the preparedness planning processes and activities of natural hazard-prone countries. Member States that traditionally deploy FMA bilaterally or otherwise may also benefit from understanding the HuMOCC concept.

I share the HuMOCC process flow on the previous page, which explains how straightforward and simplified the process flow is, yet flexible enough to be tweaked to adapt to the national coordination structure of the affected state.

Acknowledgements

This article was culled from the Typhoon Haiyan AAR Report of March 2014, Cyclone Pam AAR Report drafted by Dale Potter, UN-CMCoord Officer, and the Nepal Earthquake UN-CMCoord Mission Report submitted by Viviana de Annuuntis, UN-CMCoord Team Leader.
The Use and Coordination of Civil-Military and Defense Assets in Nepal

By Vincenzo Bollettino, Ph.D., Director, Resilient Communities Program & Tino Kreutzer, Program Manager, KoBoToolbox, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative

Late morning, April 25, 2015, a magnitude-7.8 earthquake struck Nepal, followed by a second devastating magnitude-7.3 earthquake on May 12. Centered in the Gorkha District, the initial earthquake destroyed entire villages, especially in Sindhupalchok and Ghorka. The capital of Kathmandu was fortunate to have escaped what would have been enormous destruction, had the epicenter been closer to the city. Despite the distance, the earthquake still leveled homes and buildings, including many of the nation’s historical, religious and cultural monuments. As geologists predicted, the earthquake’s complete destruction of 489,000 homes and damage to another 260,000 underscored the country’s inadequate level of preparedness.

Despite clear forecasts that an earthquake in Nepal was inevitable, and plans in place to coordinate a response with international humanitarian agencies and national and international militaries, it still took in excess of two weeks for aid to reach villages in Nepal’s mountainous regions. This is somewhat surprising given that the airport, major roads and bridges in Kathmandu remained intact, and the markets quickly reopened.

During the response to the initial earthquake, forces from at least 18 foreign militaries were deployed to Nepal. By May 15, 2015, militaries from 10 countries had already departed, all of whom represented search and rescue, engineering, or medical staff. As of May 15, the largest presence was from China and India (844 and 611 troops, respectively). The U.S. presence included at least 286 troops from Joint Task Force 505, tasked with air support and providing at least seven rotary-wing and 12 fixed-wing aircraft. The United States ultimately “delivered about 114 tons of emergency relief supplies, including plastic sheeting, shelter kits, blankets, water, medical supplies and emergency and supplemental food in support of USAID. In addition to delivering aid, the task force transported 534 personnel and conducted 63 casualty evacuations.” By contrast, China’s military support had a very minor focus on air transport, with two helicopters flying daily from a base in China to Kathmandu airport to carry personnel and supplies to remote areas.

It is the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (DART), assesses whether U.S. military assistance is needed. As of May 15, the lead United States federal agency, the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance, which through its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), assesses whether U.S. military assistance is needed.

Challenges

In comparison to other recent disasters, humanitarian relief efforts in Nepal were late to arrive and faced a multiplicity of hurdles that hampered with widespread damage, a large number of deaths and injuries, and inaccessible or difficult-to-reach villages in need of assistance. Yet, despite the need for heavy lift equipment to clear roads blocked by landslides and rotary-wing air assets to reach remote villages, there was a fairly modest international military presence in Nepal and a notably small U.S. military presence. Although there were roughly 1,000 personnel that comprised the Joint Task Force in Kathmandu, Okinawa, and U.S. Pacific Command, the actual numbers of U.S. personnel operating in the field in Nepal was small compared to their Chinese and Indian counterparts.

This is especially true when the response is compared to those that took place in Haiti in 2010 and the Philippines in 2013. Part of this can be explained at least in part by the relatively easy accessibility of Haiti and the Philippines compared to the inaccessibility of Nepal. It is also possible that close U.S. ties with the Philippines, and Haiti’s proximity to the U.S. explain the comparatively much larger U.S. efforts in these two countries as compared to the limited presence of the U.S. in Nepal. A better understanding of why the Nepalese government and the international humanitarian community did not request greater support through OFDA should help explain why the U.S. military played such a limited role in this disaster. As the lead United States federal agency, the Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance, which through its Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), assesses whether U.S. military assistance is needed.
the efficiency of the response. There were numerous logistical challenges posed by the single runway at the Kathmandu airport. It was apparent from the reports in comparison to more accurate and concrete applicability of these reports in terms of the specific context of the disaster response. For example, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) did not have access to the real-time satellite imagery provision from Digital Globe and Google’s Skybox Imaging, and the use of crowd-sourced community mapping. The emergence of large volunteer networks and community-based initiatives around the world are transforming the humanitarian architecture.

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and drones is an emerging trend in humanitarian assistance. The Humanitarian UAV Network (UNAV) reports that 80% of its members are new to the field and have voluntarily signed on to an emergent code of conduct put in place by the Humanitarian UAV Network. The use of drones in the delivery of aid to remote and isolated areas can be an effective tool in providing assistance to those in need. However, there are also concerns about the potential negative impact of drones on local communities, including privacy concerns and potential displacement of local economies. The future of drone technology in humanitarian assistance will depend on the ability of humanitarian organizations to navigate these challenges and to adapt to the rapidly evolving landscape of technology.

The Nepal earthquake response was marked by a significant mobilization of foreign military assets. The Nepalese Army has appointed a dedicated military coordination center (MNMCC) to coordinate all foreign military aid and conduct missions in Nepal. The NMGCC is coordinating all foreign military aid and conducting missions in Nepal. The U.S. military presence in Nepal was particularly notable, with the deployment of two Chinook helicopters from the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Mechanized), and a high-altitude Doppler radar system from the 159th Special Operations Field Support Detachment, 17th Special Operations Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida.

In addition, the Multi-National Military Coordination Center (MNMCC) was established to provide the physical space and personnel necessary to coordinate all foreign military aid. The NMGCC was operationalized on May 12, and was attended by representatives from more than 25 military and civilian organizations.

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The Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) is an Australian Government initiative to improve Australia’s effectiveness in civil-military collaboration for conflict and disaster management overseas. ACMC hosts Quick Impact Workshops (QIW) - with representatives from across government (Australian and international), civil society, private sector and the Australian Defence Force - to draw on the experiences and observations of Australians who have been part of an international response. The QIW supports civil-military-police capability and understanding through multagency engagement, case studies and shared information.

In February 2015, the ACMC hosted a QIW on ‘Early Considerations on Civil-Military Responses to Emerging Diseases: Ebola as a Case Study’.

Overview - The International Response to the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa

In August 2014, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council declared the Ebola virus outbreak in the West African subregion a ‘threat to international peace and security’. The U.N. request for assistance from member states resulted in the mobilization of technical expertise, medical capacity, humanitarian assistance, and both military and civil defense assets. The Australian Government contributed approximately AU$45 million to the international Ebola response, including the management of an Ebola treatment center in Sierra Leone contracted to Aspen Medical, and a regional Ebola response preparedness package focused on the Indo-Pacific. Other countries, including affected states, responded in a variety of ways, some through civil-military intervention. The United States and United Kingdom provided a civil-military health response in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively.

The Ebola outbreak has again raised concerns about the potentially devastating impact emerging diseases pose...
to human and economic welfare. The response in West Africa has highlighted the need for robust regional health architecture, and indicates a likely role for the military (either within affected states or through international assistance) following an outbreak or pandemic in the Indo-Pacific region.

The unfolding of the crisis – initially a health response and then a ramping-up as it became more than a health assistance) following an outbreak or pandemic in the region. Our region.

but would likely be involved in a health crisis response in our region.

The following key observations were drawn from the workshop presentations and discussion.

**Key Observations**

**International and Regional Health Architecture**

Global health architecture - The global health architecture is increasingly seen as not ‘fit for purpose’. There is a global capacity gap in response mechanisms for global infectious disease outbreaks, including in coordinated planning, decision-making, resource sharing, resource management, and communications and information management. The current reform of the World Health Organisation may go some way to address this; however, it will remain a temporary standard agency with emergency response dispersed across the organization.

Health security risk in the Indo-Pacific region – Underdeveloped and stretched health systems in the region make Australia’s immediate neighborhood particularly vulnerable to a major health security risk. The Indo-Pacific region has experienced increased travel, trade and urbanization based on recent economic growth. At the same time there are emerging concerns with increasing drug resistant malaria and tuberculosis in the region. Australia is working to help strengthen regional cooperative mechanisms for health security to address this, and other, potential health risks.

**Operational Learnings**

Stakeholder relationships - Work should continue to proactively build and nurture relationships in non-crisis periods. Well established, long-term relationships were central to ensuring Australia was able to respond effectively, both domestically and internationally. Relationships between the Commonwealth and State and Territory Governments were important, particularly in Australia’s early response when the focus was primarily on domestic protection and information to travellers.

Bilateral relationships with international governments, military-to-military cooperation, and international and domestic health partnerships all contributed to the successful outcomes of the response in West Africa. Civil Society engagement was crucial. The Red Cross and Medicins Sans Frontieres were key first movers and were operating on the ground instantly. They were quickly supported by international advocates (including the U.S. and U.K.) and were direct in their expectations and advice about where Australia could and should best support other efforts.

Private sector engagement – It is becoming increasingly clear that the private sector is an active responder in crisis situations. The Ebola Treatment Center established by Firestone Natural Rubber Company in Liberia became a best-practice example of a quick and effective response. The Australian Government’s engagement of Aspen Medical to deliver services in Sierra Leone also highlights the flexibility and availability of the private sector to support a government crisis response. Building understanding and partnerships with the private sector, both domestically and overseas, would enhance Australia’s ability to respond more effectively to crises in the region.

Command and control structures – The establishment of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) and insertion into affected countries saw some confusion about mandates and responsibilities. Clear lines of responsibility and reporting must be established from the outset if a mission is to operate effectively. For Australia, this means ensuring robust inter-agency coordination structures, as well as governance mechanisms for working with international partners. Effective command and control arrangements are essential to avoid duplication and counter-productive effort.

Interagency coordination – The Ebola crisis underlined that Australia’s interagency planning and response was highly effective. The Australian Government Interdepartmental Task Force (IDETF) model is well developed and works well. DFAT’s coordination of overseas response is central to managing domestic assistance efforts. However, it is also important to note that line agencies may be called on to lead (e.g. in this case the Department of Health), and good practice indicates that early centralization of coordination of effort is essential including early identification of lead agencies and points of contact. This process supports coordinated planning, timeliness of decision-making and coordination of resources.

Planning and preparedness – Tactical off-the-shelf contingency plans play an important role in operations but there is a requirement for strategic flexibility and agility in planning. Early in the Ebola response, the Australian Government established clear direction on priorities. However, as international priorities and responses changed, it was important for civil-military agencies to be flexible while strategic direction was being realigned with international partners.

Good practice also indicates that there is a need for long-term transition planning in every crisis. In the case of Ebola, Sierra Leone and other affected countries will have to grapple with a false economy over coming months that has been generated by substantial hazard-pay for medical teams, as well as dealing with the recovery of mainstream health systems.

Communication management – The media response in any crisis will deal with perceptions more than reality, as was the case with the Ebola crisis particularly in local communities and regarding international travel. Effective crisis management requires careful attention to messaging, media management and communications. These are necessities in achieving a successful outcome and must be factored in at the start of every crisis response.

Media and messaging – Media pressure in a crisis can lead to ineffective allocation of resources, particularly if it leads to ‘being seen to act’ taking priority over good planning and the coordination of response efforts. Crisis responders, both government and nongovernment, need to establish as quickly as possible common clarity of vision as the basis of their respective engagement with domestic and international media.

**Information sharing** – There is common theme in recent crisis response that management of information, analysis of data and sharing knowledge is increasingly important in inter-agency international operations, and increasingly complex. Protocols and procedures for multi-stakeholder
communication management and information sharing should be incorporated in all crisis management planning.

Cultural sensitivities and gender considerations – The international Ebola response highlighted the importance of gender, civilian protection and cultural considerations, particularly in areas such as women’s healthcare, and safe and dignified burials. Every crisis response needs to take account of cultural sensitivities and gender considerations. Rapid identification and protection of the most vulnerable in the community (e.g. children, the elderly, pregnant women and lactating mothers) should be a priority.

Learning from others - The Ebola response in West Africa highlighted several best-practice models from across civil-society, the private sector, U.K. and U.S. military, and government. The U.K. and the U.S. responses, led by DFID and USAID respectively, chose to deploy substantial military assets in West Africa. There is potential to consider these models as a template or framework should an ADF response be required in the region. The sharing of lessons reports domestically and internationally maximizes opportunities for continuous improvement.

Managing resources - Placing the right people in the right jobs is essential and experienced human resources are fundamental to effective outcomes. Effective coordination of resources on the ground in overseas operations is also key. For infectious disease outbreak, there are considerable duty of care issues relating to deployments. The management of resources should include robust arrangements for the wellbeing of personnel.

Alignment of strategic priorities – The priorities of the Australian Government are unlikely to fully align with those of the host nation, the international community, the U.N. or non-government organizations. In formulating policy advice to government, Australian agencies need to articulate how our contributions can do the most good, while balancing the needs and expectations of the wide range of interested parties.

Engagement with the U.N. - The effectiveness of U.N. missions is contingent, not only on their internal leadership, but on national and international engagement with those missions. This means that national agencies need to expose their staff to U.N. training programs and multinational U.N. focused exercises. It is too late to build this capacity once an operation has commenced. More staff needs experience in providing operational leadership for complex missions, including where the source of authority may be unclear or nonexistent.

Conclusion

The ACMC’s role in identifying lessons from interagency international operations is growing. Each crisis and operation is fundamentally different but our experiential learning indicates similarities in many areas. Robust planning, integrated and straightforward advice and central government coordination are the key lessons arising from recent operations. Australian agencies can learn from these operations and increase their preparedness to lead future Australian contingencies.

More information on the ACMC, and a summary of the workshop can be found on www.acmc.gov.au

Civil-Military Team Building

By Col. James Reilly (Ret.), USMC
While serving on active duty, I participated in a number of foreign disaster response (FDR) operations in key leadership and senior staff positions in the Philippines and Thailand, and in support of operations in Burma and Japan. These experiences offered me the unique opportunity to view civil-military relationships from the tactical to the theater strategic levels. My positions included serving as the officer-in-charge for the III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Disaster Response Assessment Team (DRAT) in the Philippines and Thailand, commander, Combined Support Group-Thailand and senior CSF 536 liaison officer to the U.S. Embassy Jakarta during Operation Unified Assistance; future operations officer, U.S. Marine Component during Operation Provide Comfort; and chief of staff, Marine Forces Pacific during Operation Tomodachi. The purpose of this article is to convey those intangibles I believe contribute to the development of solid civil-military relationships.

Published doctrine provides the accepted framework, architecture, mechanisms and authorities to enable a successful civil-military relationship. Mid-level and senior military education addresses this doctrine, military exercises familiarize and train to the doctrine, and civil-military training emphasizes the importance of establishing and exercising this relationship. However, given the differences in government culture, personal experiences and preconceived prejudices, building intangible relationships between civilian and military personnel tends to be harder than expected, compounded by the ad-hoc nature and stressful circumstances under which a FDR operation is executed. To mitigate some of these distractions, I believe the adoption, or consideration, of the following leadership-based intangibles will contribute to the development of a successful civil-military relationship.

I found there are three universal intangibles a civil-military team needs to focus on when developing their relationship in support of a FDR operation: (1) trust that all stakeholders are professionally adept and uniquely qualified in their field; (2) develop a mutually respectful relationship based on that trust; and (3) capitalize on the perspectives and expertise that each stakeholder brings to the success of the team. None of this is rocket science, and has been addressed by more qualified people than myself, but we are constantly relearning what should be a natural effort. We have now come to a point where the civil-military relationship has been operationalized and exercised both in conflict and in support of manitentary support operations throughout the globe. The capabilities, capacities and cultural uniqueness each individual brings to the civil-military team have been tested time and again. Consequently, we now have a generation of service members, humanitarians and diplomats with enough experience to identify these civil-military environments that developing and enhancing these relationships should be second nature. Unfortunately, it remains a struggle.

In that light, the following are observations of best practices learned during my experiences in support of FDR operations, and executing U.S. Pacific Command-directed humanitarian assistance and disaster response security engagement exercises and seminars. These observations offer leadership and primary and secondary relationships where I was in a position to either directly contribute to or benefit from well-defined and equally beneficial civilian-military relationships.

Setting the stage from the outset, I found that the initiation of the civil-military team concept was driven by the shared singularity of the mission. Adding to the concept was the extended strategic view of post disaster agreement. This agreement identified second and third order effects, and their impacts to both the affected nation’s and the U.S. and United Nation Country Teams’ future recovery, reconstruction and development efforts. The success of this relationship is primarily based on trust, respect, engaged civilian and military leadership, and a shared understanding between stakeholders.

This aspect was most visible when I observed Lt. Gen. Rusty Blackman (USMC), U.S. Ambassador Ralph Boyce of Thailand, and U.S. Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe of Indonesia set the conditions for success during Operation Unified Assistance. Their shared vision and visibly solid relationship directly influenced and positively impacted the development of a cohesive civil-military team. Further, the aspect of bringing together a disparate group in a high-stress environment was diminished when everyone was treated as a key member of the team. An appreciation for open and frank discussions led to transparency, a greater awareness of the problem, and was necessary to ensure a unified purpose.

Trust and Respect. This point is worth emphasizing—often the key foundation for all relationships, both personal and professional. Without trust and respect, and an appreciation for one’s capabilities in their chosen field, everything that follows is a wash. The uniqueness of experience and personality should be viewed as a strength and seen as a conduit to the development of a strong and diverse team, not a detriment.

Having worked with both Tom Dolan, U.S. Agency for International Development Development Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), and Sebastian Rhodes Stampa, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, during multiple operations and exercises in Thailand and the Philippines, I was able to observe both gentlemen approach their relationships with the military in a constructive, respectful and mutually supportive manner with such ease. The approach went a long way in facilitating the development of a strong and united effort with the military task force. These two gentlemen immediately established a level of trust and respect with their military counterparts not only due to their extensive experience and acknowledged credentials, but also by the manner in which they presented themselves.
efforts. This misconception can be explained by the very visible capabilities the military possesses, the attention the military receives, and the organizational structure the military is known for. Eliminating this misunderstanding becomes the military’s responsibility. It is important for external agencies to understand the United States disaster response authority, and for the military to ensure that the doctrinal authorities are not impacted by the military’s influence.

Where I saw the civil-military relationship truly benefit both parties was OFDA prioritizing and validating the requests the U.S. military executes. This role protects the military, while also validating OFDA as the face of U.S. coordination efforts with the affected nation and the international humanitarian community. Due to the very visible presence of the U.S. military and the focus solely on executing the approved requests for assistance, this fact was most noticeable when 3d Marine Expeditionary Brigade executed a FDR operation in the Philippines in December 2004. U.S. Embassy Manila assigned their political-military advisor to the Philippine National Disaster Management Agency to assist in the prioritization of Philippine requests for support from the military joint task force. By the embassy’s direct involvement with the Philippine relief effort, they were able to convey a realistic expectation of support, assist in the prioritization effort, position the Philippine Government for recovery and reconstruction efforts, while concurrently freeing the military joint task force to execute the requested assistance.

To paraphrase Lt. Gen. Blackman when he served as the commander of CSF: 536, the military’s goal is to depart the stage while the audience is still applauding. That audience is both the affected nation and the U.S. Embassy Country Team. The objective is for the U.S. military to work themselves out of a job while also posturing the affected nation, the U.S. Embassy, and the international humanitarian community for future success during the recovery and reconstruction efforts. A strong civil-military team will work together to ensure it not only are the immediate response requirements synchronized and aligned, but the enduring post-disaster requirements are addressed also.

In conclusion, there is no cookie-cutter approach to establishing a solid civilian-military relationship. Quite frankly, what works for one set of individuals, or in one environment, may not work for another. It all comes down to putting one’s ego aside and recognizing that the United States is represented by a multitude of agencies, all experts in their field, all oriented towards achieving the objectives – meeting the needs and requirements of the affected nation – while simultaneously acting as a trusted and valued partner to the world. Our list of successful disaster response operations far exceeds those of our failures, with the deciding factor being the strength of the team, a team forged on solid leadership, trust, respect, acknowledged roles, and an inclusive shared vision.
LIAISON: How does the Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) section fit into the overall coordination picture?  

Josef Reiterer: The objective for our section is clear: we work with international civilian and military organizations to help coordinate and appropriate aid faster to the people in need. Now, how our coordination work fits into the overall coordination landscape is a bit more difficult; in most circumstances, a coordination umbrella exists with the humanitarian coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team. In some situations, in particular where crises do not recognize international borders, it becomes a mega-disaster. I am not saying that humanitarian civil-military coordination becomes an end in itself, but it takes a different dimension when we are trying to deconflict regional military action from a more localized humanitarian aid system. At the local level, we are responding in small pockets, whereas the military traditionally responds to the whole region.

L: How can U.S. and foreign militaries best plug into UNOCHA’s coordination initiatives?  

JR: Here, we must do much more on our side. Good initiatives are underway. We would wish that every nation intending to respond with military forces to humanitarian crises participated in our global forums on humanitarian civil-military interaction and that we do not see nations being fully represented at this moment. This is one area at the strategic, global level. On the operational level, we ask all responding militaries buy into a predictable interface where assistance is prioritized based on humanitarian principles and criteria. On the tactical level, we would wish that foreign military forces deploy with knowledgeable civil-military liaison officers.

L: What challenges do you see repeatedly between civilian organizations and the military in disaster response operations?  

JR: An inconsistency of approaches; this starts with adherence to existing guidelines and policies on humanitarian civil-military coordination, continues with the infrequent collaboration with on-site coordination platforms, and ends with the lessons to be learned from joint response operations. The challenges have changed over time: two decades ago we were discussing if international military forces were able to coordinate. Now we are diplomats, mediators, negotiators, and we are focusing much more on communication techniques.

L: Have you seen any lessons learned become best practices in the international disaster response environment? If so, where?  

JR: I think some military forces are buying into the Multi-National Coordination Centre (MNCC) concept; this is progress. This provides us with a clear starting point where we want to establish the dialogue with the humanitarian international responders and the host nation. On communications and information technology, many militaries deploy with open, unclassified systems. This helps us a lot, since we are working with a simple virtual platform to coordinate. There are many more areas such as joint training and exercises where we made progress and prepare our people better to respond jointly.

L: Are there any civil-military challenges that are specific to the Asia-Pacific?  

JR: Speed! The Asia-Pacific is the most disaster prone region in the world. The more sudden an emergency occurs, the faster the response must be. In protracted humanitarian crises, hours do not count, in earthquakes they do. The only way to be fast now is training and capacity building, response preparedness, joint planning, joint exercises, and the other preparedness work of the regional UNOCHA office and actors.

L: Do you think it is easier for the military to plug into the humanitarian structure or for humanitarians to plug into a military structure?  

JR: It won’t work. The military has specific needs for coordination and the humanitarians have specific needs for coordination. So one concept, which is under development and was now applied for the third time in the Nepal crisis is the Humanitarian-Military Operations Coordination Center (HuMOCC). It’s a concept, which bridges from the military MNCC to the humanitarian response operations. Maybe the way forward is to provide a gateway - the humanitarian-military gateway – a concept that comes from Haiti and into the other crisis areas, and now Nepal, which we are trying to conceptualize, so we can navigate from one platform to the other without becoming one and the same.

L: Are there any new challenges that are emerging with the military response to mega-disasters?  

JR: Yes, there are. When I started my work as a civil-military coordinator in the 90s, I could not imagine that 15 years later I would be sitting on a Chinese medical ship. What I want to say is there are new actors responding to disasters. Some for the right reason, some out of geopolitical interest. We are not questioning any of the decision-making processes back home leading to the deployment of military forces, we are dealing with the massive challenges on-site when military forces less trained in humanitarian-military coordination hit the ground.

L: Moving forward, what would you like to see to improve coordination?  

JR: When we tour around the world, our military training and learning institutions, we still see us – UNOCHA – teaching humanitarian-civil-military coordination policies and guidelines. Learning does not happen with one speech of an UNOCHA staff. The Oslo Guidelines, the Military and Civil-Defence Assets (MCDA) Guidelines in complex emergencies, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Paper on Civil-Military Coordination, the Guide for the Use of Armed Escorts on Civil-Military Coordination and the Guide for the Use of Armed Escorts on Civil-Military Coordination must become part of the learning curriculum of all militaries supporting humanitarian action - and preferably before and not after an operation.
PARTNERS

C. S. Lewis, the great British author once wrote, “True friendship begins when one person says to another, ‘What, you too? I thought I was the only one.’” Around the world, when personnel involved in disaster and emergency management domestically share experiences with others who work internationally, they may experience this sentiment. I write this based on a spirit of friendship and partnership borne from experiencing a common problem, which transcends unique circumstances.

Emergency management personnel domestically and abroad experience many of the same challenges as they prepare and respond to disasters. In a practical sense, individuals performing disaster response activities speak the same language, regardless of country, program, agency, funding source or type of disaster. In the profession of disaster and emergency management, domestic and international humanitarian disaster responses are frequently viewed as distinctly separate, however, this article postulates that there are more critical similarities than differences and it behooves all of us to learn and share information, build and foster relationships with international partners, and recognize we may be able to improve outcomes for disaster relief victims and responders.

In recent months, two events have reinforced my belief that domestic and international disaster work are similar, have applicability to each other and are not mutually exclusive. The first was a presentation I attended at the Civil-Military Interaction Workshop, organized by the Australian Civil-Military Centre and hosted by the

By Kenneth Tingman, Retired Federal Coordinating Officer, Pacific Area Office, Federal Emergency Management Agency

THE TYRANNY OF DISTANCE

HOW DOMESTIC LESSONS CAN BE APPLIED TO OTHER NATIONS WITHIN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

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Malaysia Peacekeeping Centre. One of the speakers was a Malaysian Army physician, Lt. Col. Mohd Arshil. Lt. Col. Arshil spoke about his disaster experiences, which included the Indian Ocean Tsunami, United Nations missions in East Africa and East Timor, the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, as well as domestic disasters in Malaysia. He spoke passionately, intelligently and universally, drawing no distinctions between his disaster work at home and his disaster work abroad. On the contrary, his emphasis was the common experiences in all of his work. Specifically, he shared that most of the medical work and many of the cultural challenges were the same for him at home and abroad. I had never heard anyone talk so seamlessly about domestic and international disaster response.

The second event was the 2015 International Tsunami Symposium, “Making the Pacific Ready for the Tsunami Threat” at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Hawai’i. Laura Furgone, NOAA deputy assistant administrator for Weather Services and deputy director, National Weather Service, spoke about the United States domestic program known as NOAA’s Weather Ready Nation. The National Weather Service, NOAA, has a program known as the Disaster Declaration Program to assist the nation with electrical power restoration after an earthquake and tsunami struck in 2009.

Col. Arshil spoke about his disaster experiences, which ranged from natural disasters in Malaysia to international disasters in the Pacific, both domestically and internationally. As a result, the Solomon Islands include a discussion of disaster responses in the Pacific and I offer the following observations.

Disaster Declarations and Leadership

The “tyranny of distance” will complicate disaster responses in the Pacific, both domestically and internationally. As a result, the Solomon Islands include a discussion of the tyranny of distance in their domestic disaster response planning. One of the best ways to mitigate the tyranny of distance is to ensure that a disaster declaration is granted as quickly as possible. A timely declaration will energize personnel, funding and outside assistance, but without this first step all other steps are delayed. It is incumbent upon government personnel at all levels to be familiar with the thresholds and processes required to request a disaster declaration from either regional or national leadership.

In response to the earthquake and tsunami in American Samoa, we were able to get a Presidential Disaster Declaration (PDD) within six hours of the event. Interestingly, Governor Togiola Tulafono of American Samoa was in Hawaii when the tsunami struck, leaving him without an emergency management staff to write up the request for a disaster declaration. Through a series of phone calls with Gov. Tulafono, I was able to coordinate a disaster declaration request that had been drafted by my regional headquarters. He reviewed it with me and corrected it, and it went from the regional headquarters to FEMA’s national headquarters, then to the White House for action by the President. This process was coordinated throughout the day and each level was waiting for the request and ready to expedite it.

Due to the quick granting of a PDD, we were able to activate other federal agencies, as well as the military. A robust team of more than 50 federal personnel was deployed on a Coast Guard aircraft that very night. In less than 24-hours after the event, the team was on the ground in American Samoa performing a variety of response work. From the perspective of the affected population, a large team of federal and military response personnel arrived before they woke up the next morning.

This act of government coordination was a firm symbol of full commitment to the people of American Samoa. With as many potential points of failure as there are places to deploy resources, the military and other federal agencies were able to make the right decisions at the right time. In less than 24-hours after the event, the team was on the ground in American Samoa, most of those problems were invisible. Although this was a U.S. domestic response, logistics and movement control decisions were being made from the east coast of the United States, relayed through California and Hawaii and then to American Samoa. With many potential points of failure as there were in the thousands of miles the coordination crossed – like with an international response effort in the Pacific – things worked relatively smoothly as we received supplies and personnel. It may not have been easy every step of the way, but all of the logistics professionals, both civil and military, worked hard to overcome problems, collaborated as one federal team and kept the affected population of American Samoa at the forefront of their actions.

The military is often the tool of convenience when facing large, logistics problems in disaster response – they are very quick to get people and things from one place to another. We had a requirement to deploy a large number of power generators, plus all of the associated equipment (transformers, cables and fuel), in a short amount of time. We did not want to ship any equipment separately and find ourselves with generators but no way to connect them to the power grid, so we wanted to receive the shipment as one package. As the logistics team examined the requirement and tried to find a resource to meet this requirement, it became clear the distance would require multiple trips for military assets to bring all of the equipment in. A decision was made to contract two flights of the Antonov, the world’s largest aircraft, to carry all of the equipment in. A decision was made to contract two flights of the Antonov, the world’s largest aircraft, instead of military airlift. This was a good example of having a requirements process that matched the need. At times civil-military solutions are a better fit to mitigate the logistical challenges posed by the tyranny of distance, and governments need to maintain close civil-military relationships to best meet those challenges.

Use of the Military

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Oslo Guidelines are “guidelines for the use of foreign military and civil defense assets (MCDAs) in disaster relief”. One of the most basic tenants of the Oslo Guidelines is that of last resort, which...
to satisfy and the resources available to meet them.”

Throughout the Pacific, however, many military forces are the first responders in their countries, so it is common to see militaries early in the disaster response process. Many populations in the Pacific even expect to see military personnel perform vital roles in disaster response; seeing uniformed personnel provides a degree of comfort and reassurance to the affected population, such was the case in American Samoa. The military response was unusual because it consisted of Hawaii National Guard personnel, active duty personnel in the form of a Defense Coordinating Office and Defense Coordinating Element (DCO/DCE), a local U.S. Army Reserve unit and U.S. Army Corps of Engineer personnel (USACE). The local U.S. Army Reserve unit had just returned home from a deployment to Iraq and was not going to be denied supporting their family and friends; they all showed up in uniform and ready to work the first day! The reserve soldiers performed a number of tasks, but the most noteworthy was working with the Red Cross and FEMA Corps to distribute supplies to the villages. Culturally, the distribution of goods is done through the village chief, or Matai. As it turned out, many of the reserve personnel held Matai titles, and they could speak Matai. Using uniformed Matai led to an unprecedented level of transparency for the distribution and made the entire effort run extremely smoothly. The lesson here is that, while use of the military to distribute goods is not a common practice by humanitarians around the world, it is effective in the Pacific, especially among the island nations.

Power Restoration

Loss of power and the restoration of power is a huge challenge among Pacific Island nations simply because there is no way to borrow power from neighboring nations. The lack of backup power, based on the tyranny of distance, is a common theme. In American Samoa, the tsunami completely destroyed one of the two power plants. A joint power committee was formed consisting of personnel from the territorial emergency management office, FEMA, the American Samoa Power Authority and USACE. Within two weeks, this committee had developed a three-phase approach for restoring power. The first phase required the deployment of 52 FEMA generators that would be distributed at critical locations along the power grid. The phase-one generators were operational in six weeks and stayed in place for three months. The second phase called for the placement of 28-megawatt generators at the site of the destroyed power plant and was to last for 18 to 24 months, until a permanent power solution was implemented. Remarkably, five years later, the phase-two solution, which was conceived within the first weeks of the response, remains operational. The role the USACE team played was simply invaluable and the stopgap measures they helped create are now having long-term effects. Every disaster that I have responded to had some very prominent commonalities: an affected population, a high impact event that needed assistance, unique cultural sensitivities, a process to request assistance, a planning process, logistics and prioritization of resources, response objectives, the use of unique military capabilities, and the necessity that agencies coordinate and collaborate on response activities. The tyranny of distance makes these challenges even more acute in the Pacific. The more information that we can share with each other about disaster experienc- es, especially in this vast region, the better prepared we will be to respond to the next disaster, whether domestic or international; the mission is still the same – to save lives and mitigate suffering, and in the process, foster international partnerships.

One of the most effective ways of coordinating civil-military operational contract support in disaster response environment is through the Joint Contracting Support Board platform, which gathers the necessary players before a disaster occurs and open up a fruitful dialogue. Most relief supplies are in some way non-organic to the organization providing the relief and integration with all stakeholders is stressed as a key element. Another element is the understanding of the secondary and tertiary effects of executing contracts in a given area, such as positive or negative implications to economic stability, host nation politics, etc.

OCS is not simply the act of buying things, that’s known as contract- ing or procurement. OCS takes into account the roles and responsibilities between the territory and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in disaster recovery after an earthquake and tsunami devastated the country.

The memorandum outlines the role of the Federal Coordinating Officer Kenneth Tingman and American Samoa Governor Togiola Liaison Volume VII

By Maj. Chris Heardi, Deputy Operations Division Chief, Air Force Installation Contracting Agency - Operating Location Pacific

A fter a disaster, there is no shortage of personnel and organizations with good intentions who want to drop in on the scene and assist those in need. This is both a blessing and a curse. While having boots on the ground can be helpful to those in need, it can also be a strain on communica- tion and resources; resources that could otherwise be directed toward survivors. Around the globe, the assumption can be made that any relief effort associated with a disaster will involve some variant of a civil-military response. Poor coordination between civil and military organiza- tions may bring additional challenges and constraints beyond the damage and despair already experienced by the population. Proper planning, coordination, and where appropri- ate, integration, can help mitigate the realities faced during a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) event.

There are many ways to coordinate in a multi-agency landscape. One of the most effective routes is to engage appropriate stakeholders before an incident occurs and open up a fruitful dialogue. Most relief supplies are in some way non-organic to the organization providing the relief (i.e. most supplies are contracted out to commercial sources, either in advance or under a just-in-time philosophy). On the military side, the process of acquiring goods and services from commercial sources coupled with the necessary planning for, coordination with, and integra- tion of contractors, is known as Operational Contract Support (OCS). As part of this concept, coordination, planning, and decision making is key.

Federal Coordinating Officer Kenneth Tingman and American Samoa Governor Togiola sign a memorandum of agreement Oct. 7, 2009. The memorandum outlines the roles and responsibilities between the territory and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in disaster recovery after an earthquake and tsunami devastated the country.
account the broader process and impacts across a given landscape. For example, taking OCS into account when responding to a HA/DR event, the supporting nation may choose to obtain non-critical, readily available supplies from local businesses instead of bringing those supplies in with organic forces, as a way of infusing money into the local economy. One has to be careful not to compete for critical or limited resources, but if readily available, injecting currency into the local economy may increase efforts to stabilize the area, maintain or increase employment, build coalitions of support networks, and so on. These positive effects of applying OCS will not only support the immediate needs of the disaster, but also garner stronger relationships in the long term.

When applying OCS, it’s also important to understand ways to leverage the whole-of-government approach to a given operation. While OCS is not exclusive to HA/DR events, nor is it based solely on civil-military interaction, through effective use of OCS, the military can facilitate an effective platform for working with their civilian counterparts during a HA/DR event.

One of the most expeditious ways of doing this is through holding a recurring Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB) in your joint operating area (JOA). A JCSB is an OCS concept discussed in Joint Publication 4-10, and is initially held during military operation phase “zero”, to bring various agencies together to understand constraints and capabilities, deconflict common concerns, and determine the most appropriate contract mechanism to execute requirements for the customer. Doctrine gives us flexibility in which to hold the JCSB and who to invite. As such, the JCSB platform should be open to and coordinate their efforts through a joint response.

Furthermore, before going into a particular environment, it’s important for planners to focus efforts on conducting an analysis of the operating environment. Doing so will allow planners (and those later in charge of execution) to best posture for and respond to any contingency. This analysis includes an assessment of the available infrastructure, currency conditions, employment situation, economic factors, military and cultural conditions, nongovernmental organization (NGO) presence, and any other information providing a clear picture of what to expect when going into a given JOA. Situational awareness is extremely challenging when developing priorities and assessments associated with a disaster. Both civil and military organizations conduct various versions of analysis on locations within a given operational area. As the response is underway, this analysis should continue and serve leaders with the need for any adjustments to decisions on the ground. Civil and military organizations sharing information of their respective analysis before, during, and after an event is critical to success. The JCSB and subsequent working groups provides for a platform for all stakeholders to share information at the unclassified level.

The footprint, organic capability, politics, costs, chain of command, constraints, responsibilities, and even objectives are often very different between civilian and military organizations. Understanding upfront where these factors cross will allow both sides to be more effective and minimize any negative secondary or tertiary effects to either party. Competition for resources and undue strain on existing infrastructure are two of the biggest areas where poor communication between the civil and military agencies pose a problem. If the military is not communicating about how many aircraft are bringing in supplies, civilian agencies may be expending unnecessary effort to obtain the same supplies. If the civilian agencies are not communicating assessments of infrastructure capacity such as airfield or roadways, the military may be making poor assumptions in their planning efforts and in turn, making false promises to government leaders in terms of the level of support the military can provide.

Ultimately, civil authorities are in charge of HA/DR activities. This puts the military in a supporting role. This often means the military needs to be very careful to allow the local government or appointed civil authority to lead the response and provide them with as accurate information as possible. The forces and equipment the military brings to bear can be substantial, but are often misunderstood by civil authorities. That means the military needs to be as transparent as possible and even proactive in sharing information. Likewise, as the requirements generator, the civilian leadership needs to provide clear, accurate, and timely information to the military so they may support in the most efficient and least disruptive manner. There are multiple automated tools out there for facilitating this coordination, but given the rate of change and other dynamics associated with HA/DR events, human discussion at the face-to-face and telephonic level often proves most accurate. For contracted solutions, the JCSB represents a defined solution for communication challenges.

There are still other challenges that a better understanding of the OCS concept can help mitigate or avoid. Competition for resources is an often overlooked challenge. Personnel on the ground want to be proactive and responsive to the needs of the people. Not factoring in the reality of others on the ground doing the same thing will cause confusion and inefficiency at best.
Building Resilience through Partnerships

By Taryn Ino, Program Assistant, R3ADY Asia-Pacific

In 2011, economic losses from natural disasters, such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and the Southeast Asian floods, totaled nearly $400 billion; more than 75 percent of the damage occurred in the Asia-Pacific region. That same year, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Honolulu, R3ADY Asia-Pacific was launched as the Asia-Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience (APDR3) Network by U.S.-based organizations from academia, civil society, government, military, and philanthropy on the premise that there are steps we can take to mitigate the risks and impacts of natural disasters by working together across all sectors of society.

A lot has changed since 2011 – including the name, APDR3. The organization rebranded as R3ADY Asia-Pacific in September 2014, and remains committed to reducing the risks of natural disasters and building resilient communities and economies through innovative and strategic partnerships.

One example of a competition for resources being avoided was after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. U.S. military bases in the area experienced damage as well as off-base infrastructure. Rather than seek out supplies and services immediately from the local contractors, the base leadership, through frequent communications with the off-base civil authorities, understood that generators would be a high-demand item for the population. Generators first. This single action resulted in not only a quicker response to those in immediate need, but streamlined the civil authority’s ability to stabilize the community, and drove positive relations between the U.S. military and Japanese civil authorities into the future.

Military professionals responding to a HA/DR event often think tactically; how do we solve the problem in front of us? OCS teaches us to think more operationally, even strategically. How do we best solve the problem in front of us, without causing unintended consequences for our partners and allies?

The goal behind OCS is to spur a transformational culture change within the DOD, getting everyone to think outside the box and consider all effects of OCS. Through increased communication and early planning, change can take place.

Broadening the concept beyond military operations brings with it new challenges, but still boils down to transparency, planning and open communication between the civil and military organizations charged with responding to contingencies.

The military is structured for rapid deployment and immediate impact while working within a structured chain of command. Sometimes in a HA/DR response the civil authorities need military assistance in executing rapid deployment for relief supplies, without the military being in charge of operations. With civilian authorities in charge of leading direct response, this leadership brings with it the challenge of asking for the appropriate levels of indirect support.

The military is structured for rapid deployment for relief supplies, without the military being in charge of operations. With civilian authorities in charge of leading direct response, this leadership brings with it the challenge of asking for the appropriate levels of indirect support. FEMA and USAID are the federal agencies charged with being the frontline in coordinating with civil authorities for U.S. support to HA/DR events. Bringing the organizations into the JCSB process will help build relationships early, provide for exchange of ideas, and posture both the civil and military authorities to best respond in the event of an emergency.

In the U.S. Pacific Command JOA, there has been no shortage of HA/DR events, and every indication is that they will continue to be an unfortunate reality in our environment. Bringing civil and military stakeholders together early will serve to leverage our lessons observed from the past, turn them into lessons learned now and problems avoided in the future.
R3ADY fulfills its mission by aligning the resources and expertise of multiple sectors and industries, building knowledge for informed action, and designing effective solutions and strategies spurred by a shared responsibility to assist and mitigate the impacts of R3ADY’s successes stems from its expansive network and relationships. The 12-member advisory board highlights the diversity of key partners which include military organizations (U.S. Pacific Command), government organizations (FEMA and NOAA), philanthropies (Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation), private companies (Chevron) and academic institutions (University of Hawaii), to name a few. The growing involvement of military organizations in natural disaster management provides ample opportunity for civil-military coordination through R3ADY. Engagement of military organizations in preparedness activities helps to cultivate relationships between multiple stakeholders and ease the challenges of coordination when the military is asked to assist and manage disaster response.

In 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan tore through the Philippines, result- ing in more than 6,300 fatalities and displacing nearly 8 million people.1 The 2015 Nepal Earthquake resulted in over 8,600 fatalities and displaced an estimated 2.8 million people.2 These events serve as recent reminders of the importance of working to mitigate risk in the Asia-Pacific, one of the most disaster-prone regions of the world. There are many existing orga- nizations that focus on disaster response – a critically important phase of disaster management – but R3ADY was created to focus on R3, or risk reduction and resilience. Says Janev Bavishi, executive direc- tor of R3ADY, “It’s slightly harder to sustain attention on R3 because preparedness doesn’t create a sense of urgency like disaster response.”

R3ADY’s work is aimed at mainstreaming disaster preparedness across all sectors, and creating strong connections between stakeholders from different sectors before a disaster strikes.

Building Resilient Communities
R3ADY has had recent success garnering attention and action on preparedness from its collaboration with the University of Gadjah Mada (UGM), the University of Hawaii (UH) Social Science Research Institute, and Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) on community-based early warning systems in Indonesia. Landslides are one of the most frequent disasters in Indonesia, and in 2014, it was the most dangerous, causing 408 deaths and displacing nearly 80,000 residents.3 In December 2014, more than 70 people were killed in a major landslide in Banjarnegara. Using UGM’s community-based landslide risk assessment and early warning project as a case study, the team developed a framework bridging bottom-up (community-based) and top-down (regional or national) approaches to disaster risk reduction. The framework is an innovative and replicable approach to disaster risk reduction activities, and has been successful in actively engaging multiple sectors at all levels.

“Disaster mitigation is the responsibility of everyone, not only the government,” said Dr. Wahyu Wilopo, the head of Central Laboratory, Geological Engineering Department, Gadjah Mada University. “R3ADY improves collaborations and networking between the government, private sector and community.”

Begun in 2007, UGM has implement- ed a community-based landslide early warning project in Central Java. The UGM team designed unique early warning equipment locally so that it is less expensive and more appropriate for local conditions. UGM researchers make adjustments for each community’s specific cultural and economic considerations. Furthermore, they have discovered that a key component to the success of the system is the active participation of the community in the process, so community residents understand the risks and feel a sense of ownership over the devices. UGM’s approach of engaging communities and installing early warn- ing systems has shown remarkable results in reducing disaster risks and saves lives. In November 2007, just months into the project, an early warning device in Pagangan rang four-hours ahead of a landslide, allowing 35 households to evacuate before the landslide buried 10 homes with no casualties. More recently, in Sijeruk Village, an early warning instrument sounded its alarms, a majority of the people relocated to a safer area before the land moved 2-3 meters.

Collaborating with R3ADY has helped UGM connect with new partners and expand UGM’s innovative practice. R3ADY has helped to bridge UGM’s work with the efforts of various government and nongovernmental partners in identifying existing opportunities for collaboration. “One example is the collaboration with Mercy Corps for the installation of landslide (early warning systems) in Bandung Barat District, West Java Province,” added Dr. Wilopo. “The installation was initiated after the donor meeting in Jakarta.”

Through formal exchanges and workshops, as well as informal introduc- tions, R3ADY has succeeded in cultivating concrete commitments of equipment, expertise, and resources to extend the positive impacts of UGM’s practice.

Before the partnership between R3ADY and UGM, early warning system devices were installed in seven locations, mainly on Java Island. In the last year, R3ADY facilitated UGM’s connection and collaboration with new partners, which expanded its effective early warning practice to 27 locations. The R3ADY project also helped to raise the visibility of UGM’s efforts at the world conference, sharing its practice and discussed policy mechanisms and resources needed to expand and scale the project nation-ally and region-wide.

R3ADY engages in a variety of events at the WCDRR to emphasize the importance of multi-stakeholder partnerships for disaster risk reduc- tion and resilience. R3ADY events focused on a multi-stakeholder approach to building resilience in a tourism destination, and featured input from experts in government, private sector and academia.

Strengthening Community and Economic Resilience of Tourism Destinations

Tourism is an important industry to many communities and economies in the Asia-Pacific region, contributing to a significant portion of national income and employment. In 2013, Asia and the Pacific welcomed 248 million international tourists, with tourism earnings of $359 billion.1 However, the region is highly vul- nerable to natural disasters. Natural disasters can disrupt tourism-dependent hotspots through a sudden drop in tourist arrivals and damage to the infrastructure critical to the sector. Making an entire tourism destination safer and more resilient ultimately benefits local communities and livelihoods through improved safety and protection.

Based in Hawaii and surrounded by a bustling tourism industry, R3ADY invited the United Nations Office of Disaster Risk Management (UN- ODR) to speak with stakeholders about an emerging program focused on making hotels safer and more resilient.2 The Pacific Risk Management ‘Ohana (PRiMO), and the Hawaii Tourism Authority organized a meeting with hotels to learn about and provide feedback on UNISDR’s plans.

“It became clear that hotels, es- pecially large hotels, had existing disaster management plans in place,” said Bavishi. “What were missing were partnerships with critical stake- holders.”

Despite hotels being built tsunami-resistant, having installed hurricane-rated windows, and training staff and personnel on evacuation plans, they could only recover and resume operations if the airports, roads, and...
“The Boxing Day Tsunami was a learning experience for Phuket,” she added. “Similar to Hawaii’s hotels, there has been extensive disaster management planning done by Phuket businesses. Often these plans are developed independently, and the challenge was whether they will work in conjunction with the other sectors’ efforts if another disaster occurs.”

By building on the existing work that has been done and shifting the focus from individual and institutions to working with a network of stakeholders, the project will make the destination as a whole more resilient. Other critical stakeholders must be integrated into the process, including local government officials; key companies in the tourism sector, such as hotels, restaurants, and utilities; relevant community organizations; and others.

An initial workshop in Phuket brought together representatives of local hotels and urban associations, the telecommunication industry, hospitals, and the Governor’s Office to gauge interest in a multi-stakeholder destination resilience project, and received positive feedback. Future steps will be collectively mapping and assessing vulnerabilities, examining existing plans for gaps, identifying infrastructure vulnerabilities, and developing tangible plans. The methodology, lessons, and best practices from Phuket will be documented in order to eventually serve as a guide to be scaled and replicated as needed.

R3ADY has engaged in a range of activities in over the past several years and has experienced several early successes bringing together diverse organizations at different levels, and helping to sustain these relationships long-term. By creating a culture of collaboration around disaster risk reduction, R3ADY hopes to continue to make strides toward mainstreaming partnerships for a more resilient future.

Connecting Diverse Partners

Critical to the tourism resilience project, or any project aimed at disaster risk reduction, is the ability to promote more effective coordination to support disaster response operations. By creating a culture of collaboration around disaster risk reduction, R3ADY hopes to continue to make strides toward mainstreaming partnerships for a more resilient future.

Re-examining the Past:
Cooperative U.S.-Japan Disaster Preparedness and Response: A Progress Report

By Pete Novick

In 1997, the commander of U.S. Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ) established a position – emergency management (EM) officer – and I had the good fortune to be the first incumbent. Our tiny office of one prepared a presentation, and by way of introduction, went around to other U.S. military and Japanese embassies in Tokyo, the U.S. military recreational centers in Japan to brief staff personnel primarily in operations, plans, logistics, medical and civil engineering. The audiences were attentive and polite; their most frequent question: “what is emergency management?”

Fast forward eighteen years, and we can see that the increasing sophistication of bilateral and multilateral civil-military and military-military planning, coordination, training and most importantly, actual disaster response operations, has elevated EM in importance not only for what it does – helping people displaced by disaster and protecting property – but also for the complementary support it provides to other missions. In comparison to other military missions, that often require large capital investment, EM initially asks you only to bring an open mind and a sharp pencil to the table to learn about responding to the world’s supply of come-as-you-are events.

In 2000, we discussed our initial efforts toward host nation civil and military coordination in an article published in Liaison (Vol. 2, No. 1), the highlights:

- Kanagawa Prefecture Government (KPG) Manual for Mutual Help (1998): U.S. Army Japan (USARJ), CNFJ and KPG coordinated development of a manual to promote more effective coordination to support disaster response operations. KPG, USARJ and CNFJ subsequently used this manual in support of Japan’s annual national disaster exercises and demonstrations. From the onset, these exercises involved the exchange of information in response to scripted exercise events.

- TRANSPORTEX (1999): In this two-day exercise, USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) ship JDS Osumi (LST-4001) conducted demonstrations of disaster response capabilities (at sea phase) and participated in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) operations seminar (in port phase). This exercise was one of the first U.S.-JMSDF efforts to demonstrate disaster response capabilities, and provided a valuable precedent for follow-on disaster response coordination and exercises, and real-world responses to natural disasters.

In this article, “Emergency Management (EM) refers to planning, preparedness and response operations for natural and man-made disasters, both national and international, addressing potential loss of life, property, and the environment, and the programs to support humanitarian operations with a particular emphasis on displacement of people and destruction of property. EM planning, preparedness and response operations, also referred to as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) planning, is critical to the efficient and effective delivery of assistance, transportation, medical care and other critical needs identified by affected people, nations and agencies involved in the disaster response effort.”

In this article, “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) planning is critical to the efficient and effective delivery of assistance, transportation, medical care and other critical needs identified by affected people, nations and agencies involved in the disaster response effort.”

References

1. Liaison. Winter 2000

2. KPG, USARJ and CNFJ subsequently used this manual in support of Japan’s annual national disaster exercises and demonstrations.

3. KPG, USARJ and CNFJ subsequently used this manual in support of Japan’s annual national disaster exercises and demonstrations.

4. The use of this tool in the United States is voluntary, with the exception of certain mandatory regulations.

5. The United States and Japan continued to participate in a series of bilateral exercises, including the following:

a. JMSDF ship JDS Ōsumi (LST-4001) conducted demonstrations of disaster response capabilities (at sea phase) and participated in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) operations seminar (in port phase). This exercise was one of the first U.S.-JMSDF efforts to demonstrate disaster response capabilities, and provided a valuable precedent for follow-on disaster response coordination and exercises, and real-world responses to natural disasters.

b. TRANSPORTEX (1999): In this two-day exercise, USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) and Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) ship JDS Osumi (LST-4001) conducted demonstrations of disaster response capabilities (at sea phase) and participated in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) operations seminar (in port phase). This exercise was one of the first U.S.-JMSDF efforts to demonstrate disaster response capabilities, and provided a valuable precedent for follow-on disaster response coordination and exercises, and real-world responses to natural disasters.

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Japan, where the absence of such guidance may make it more difficult to engage in both preparedness planning and actual response operations. Japan Self Defense Forces are integrated into national and prefecture disaster planning and response, and this MOU opened the window to expand the range of coordination between the U.S. Navy and JMSDF, and made subsequent coordination easier.

In the two years following the original article, the terrorist bombing of USS Cole (DDG-67) and the 9/11 terrorist attacks struck at the heart of EM preparedness. While the CNFJ - JMSDF bilateral coordination for natural disaster planning continued at a steady pace, and military personnel were invited to observe these exercises, which provided the basis for continuing dialogue and response coordination efforts. It should be noted that U.S. Navy and Japanese civil fire departments, under their mutual aid agreements, enjoyed close working relationships and some integrated response capabilities. DOD established Joint Project Manager Guardian (JPMG) as the acquisition authority for systems and equipment to support WMD response operations at U.S. military installations worldwide, including mass notification, equipment, and personnel support. Rear Adm. Robert Girrier, commander of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 7, explained operations supporting earthquake and tsunami relief efforts to Japan Self-Defense Forces Lt. Gen. Eiji Kimmizuka, commanding general of Joint Task Force Tsoungoku, March 31, 2011. Here, Rear Adm. Robert Girrier, left, commander of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 7, explains operations supporting earthquake and tsunami relief efforts to Japanese and American civil and military personnel.


• Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Coordination for Disaster Preparedness and Disaster Relief Operations (1999): In the first bilateral, service-to-service MOU of its type, JMSDF Maritime Staff Office and CNFJ agreed to protocols for disaster response notification, information exchange and coordination. Having a formal bilateral coordination mechanism in place is important in Japan, as it provides operational guidance for coordination, where the absence of such guidance may make it more difficult to engage in both preparedness planning and actual response operations. Japan Self Defense Forces are integrated into national and prefecture disaster planning and response, and this MOU opened the window to expand the range of coordination between the U.S. Navy and JMSDF, and made subsequent coordination easier.

The U.S. and Japan have a long history of military-military and civil-military cooperation in disaster preparedness and response, including after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. Here, Rear Adm. Robert Girrier, left, commander of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 7, explains operations supporting earthquake and tsunami relief efforts to Japan Self-Defense Forces Lt. Gen. Eiji Kimmizuka, commanding general of Joint Task Force Tsoungoku, March 31, 2011.

Since then, the U.S. Navy and Japan civil and military organizations have continued building on this foundation and the Navy continues to support Japan’s annual disaster exercises, which take place around the nation on September 1st. For example, in 2012, Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center Yokosuka personnel provided assistance to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government with relief supply operations as part of the annual Japan-wide disaster drills. Although not part of the above civil-military cooperation discussion, it should be noted that JMSDF and the U.S. Navy also participate in Pacific Partnership, the largest humanitarian and disaster response preparation mission in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. From its origins as a response operation following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, which killed nearly a quarter of a million people, Pacific Partnership has grown in size and scope. Marking its ninth mission in 2014, Pacific Partnership provided direct assistance to Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Republic of the Philippines. A JMSDF ship, JDS Kusakabi (LST 4003), served as the U.S. primary mission platform for the first time Pacific Partnership was led from a partner nation’s vessel.

Clearly, both U.S. Navy and Japanese civil and military leaders recognize the value of increased bilateral civil-military and military-military emergency management coordination. The detail and thoroughness of Japan’s preparedness planning and funding, mitigation efforts, public awareness campaigns, emergency alert and notification systems, and coordination demonstrate a keen commitment to the welfare of all citizens and residents. Tsunami, a term now used all over the world, is a Japanese word which means ‘wave in the harbor’ (港の波). It was named long before the event was understood. In the many years of bilateral coordination for disaster preparedness and response, the foundation of friendship and partnership between the U.S. and Japan has hope-fully moved us away from merely naming an event to understanding it in a profound and useful way. Together, the U.S. Navy and Japan have made civil-military and military-military cooperative planning, preparedness and response to disasters a key element of bilateral coopera-tion, and have used and built upon agreements for nearly two decades to the benefit of both nations.

The views expressed in this article are the authors own.
Improving Response to International Health Emergencies

By Elizabeth Nathaniel, Analyst at ANSER, & Frances Veasey, Principal Analyst at ANSER and Deputy Director of Banyan Analytics

On January 28 and 29, 2015, Banyan Analytics conducted a U.S. Military Assistance to International Health Emergency Response: Examining Frameworks for an Ebola-like Disaster in the Asia-Pacific, a two-day tabletop exercise and high-level discussion involving domestic and international participants. The exercise consisted of four events followed by moderated discussion that focused on the following topics: (1) international health response resources and the process to request U.S. support, (2) appropriate use of Department of Defense assets for health disaster response, (3) force protection issues and adapting response operations, and (4) risk communication challenges and effective risk communication approaches. This tabletop exercise provided an opportunity to discuss approaches for effective, coordinated international response to a health emergency in the Asia-Pacific. Discussions highlighted three main themes for improvement: public health preparedness, coordination and communication, and challenges related to the use of U.S. military assets for response to international health emergencies. This article represents a cross-section of the discussions from the event; further discussion on these topics with additional research and analysis, along with additional discussion topics, may be found in the final After Action Report.

Focus on Public Health Preparedness

Focusing on public health preparedness, the preparation phase can help ensure the local capacity to rapidly recognize and respond to an outbreak, containing the health threat before it reaches crisis levels. Many nations have made investments of some level into public health initiatives, driven by concerns about pandemic influenza and other endemic disease threats. A number of these investments focused on building surveillance and laboratory capacity, which may be adapted to address other health issues such as hemorrhagic fevers. Some nations in the Asia-Pacific, however, have faced challenges building the capacity needed to respond to health threats and maintaining existing investments using limited resources. Applying capabilities-based analysis methods can help planners identify local and regional gaps in capabilities, providing leaders with a more informed decision-making process for initiating, implementing, and maintaining public health investments.

Understanding the response capacity of the impacted nation can also help define criteria for what constitutes an emergency by identifying clearer thresholds for when the impacted nation would be overwhelmed. Since exponential growth of cases during an outbreak can quickly overwhelm local capacity and the existing international response system is too slow to keep pace with such a crisis, knowing the limits of impacted nations in advance could allow international response organizations to lead time for possible movement of resources and support prior to the point that the disaster overwhelms the country. Given the importance of public health preparedness activities, discussions focused on the need to further expand outreach programs in the Asia-Pacific to build partner capacity for monitoring, detecting, and responding to disease outbreaks.

The United States engages with partner nations in the Asia Pacific for capability building through a number of programs. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provides direct investment and program development, the Centers for Disease Control provides epidemiological and rapid response training, and U.S. Pacific Command conducts outreach, military-to-military training, and joint medical diplomacy missions within its area of responsibility. The National Guard also hosts a successful engagement program for capacity building, the State Partnership Program. Administered by the National Guard Bureau, the programs are designed to link U.S. foreign policy objectives through support of U.S. security cooperation missions. As a domestic force, the National Guard maintains defense support of civil authorities as a primary mission, and that allows for not only military-to-military engagement but also civilian-military and whole-of-community engagement.1 The U.S. Government should continue to invest in and leverage these programs to aid partner nations in advancing their own health preparedness and response capabilities.

Coordination and Communication in International Health Emergencies

The current response system for health emergencies is too slow to address the rapidly evolving needs of a growing epidemic, and it may be further delayed by time-distance factors in the Asia-Pacific.

Discussions highlighted the time taken to identify, request, and receive international support as a key challenge to effective response to health emergencies. A lack of bilateral and multilateral frameworks and agreements for international disaster response can slow access to resources and hamper coordination among international partners. Developing preexisting relationships and established frameworks with all partners, including regional forums such as ASEAN, NGOs, and private-sector partners, using a “whole community” approach, will improve coordination of international disaster response operations.

Response requires effective communications to share situational awareness information and avoid duplication of effort. Use of common language becomes an issue for international response, since responding organizations might face foreign language barriers as well as differing terminology. U.S. frameworks for coordination and communication such as the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System provide standardization and scalability that can help guide operations involving a variety of actors. Some nations in the Asia-Pacific have begun to develop organizational structures and frameworks based on U.S. models, with U.S. outreach programs supporting such efforts. Beyond this bilateral work, the U.S. could work with international partners to develop regional response agreements and an international response framework to allow more coordinated and delivery of resources. While the systems do not

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2The National Guard State Partnership Program, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2013.

3“Whole community” refers to expanding incident management principles beyond government-accounting but also civilian-military and whole-of-community engagement. NGOs, and the private sector.

4Eric Weiner, Deputy Director of Banyan Analytics, Africa at the Banyan Analytics tabletop exercise.

5A USAID official describes challenges encountered during the U.S. military response to Ebola in West Africa at the Banyan Analytics tabletop exercise.
necessarily need to follow the Incident Command System model, an established framework for decision-making usually only involved in either direct participations including infrastructure support, transportation, and logistics. While many individuals argued that the U.S. military may not be limited to the typical types of response that it provides in other types of natural disasters. To meet response requirements for a health emergency, the U.S. military personnel during humanitarian operations, how- ever, creates additional issues such as impacts to contin- ued coordination with nongovernmental organizations. NGOs are key to health emergency response since they represent a majority of the personnel involved in public health and medical response operations, but coordination and cooperation of NGOs with the military has been a topic of debate. In a 2006 article, the Executive Director of Médecins Sans Frontières–USA, Nicolas de Torrenté, stated that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the use of the military and conducting humanitarian operations, and he urged NGOs to avoid working in close cooperation with militaries. On the other hand, some advocate better civil-military integration for both civilian authorities and NGOs in light of increased military involvement in humanitarian affairs. In large-scale disasters involving multiple response organizations conducting varied response and relief operations, coordination needs to occur all fronts to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that gaps remain in capabilities are met in a timely manner. U.S. decision-makers must have a better understanding of the impacts of such decisions on coordination of response operations with civilian organizations when planning to alter arming orders or standing rules of engagement.

Conclusion

Both long-term, chronic health crises and emerging infectious disease threats are health security populations in the Asia-Pacific and internationally. Working prior to an outbreak to improve access to health care, build capabilities for detecting and addressing infectious disease outbreaks, and strengthen coordination and communication methods will enhance population health in the near and long terms. The U.S. Government has a role to play in improving health security internationally and has committed to do so not just with the U.S. military’s role in the recent Ebola epidemic in West Africa, but also through preparatory activities in line with the Global Health Security Agenda. Given the past event responses and scenario-based exercises can help organizations develop a clear picture of gaps that need to be addressed and the best ways to do so in order to promote greater global health.

Force protection issues will impact the scope of U.S. military support in a country with an infectious disease outbreak. Social unrest and civil disturbance, driven by local instabilities and fears due to a disease outbreak, can create security concerns for responding personnel. Arming U.S. military personnel during humanitarian operations, however, creates additional issues such as impacts to continued coordination with nongovernmental organizations. NGOs are key to health emergency response since they represent a majority of the personnel involved in public health and medical response operations, but coordination and cooperation of NGOs with the military has been a topic of debate. In a 2006 article, the Executive Director of Médecins Sans Frontières–USA, Nicolas de Torrenté, stated that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the use of the military and conducting humanitarian operations, and he urged NGOs to avoid working in close cooperation with militaries. On the other hand, some advocate better civil-military integration for both civilian authorities and NGOs in light of increased military involvement in humanitarian affairs. In large-scale disasters involving multiple response organizations conducting varied response and relief operations, coordination needs to occur all fronts to avoid duplication of efforts and ensure that gaps remain in capabilities are met in a timely manner. U.S. decision-makers must have a better understanding of the impacts of such decisions on coordination of response operations with civilian organizations when planning to alter arming orders or standing rules of engagement.

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By Julia Brooks, Legal Research Associate, Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, & David Polatty, Associate Professor, U.S. Naval War College

The recent international humanitarian response to the 7.8-magnitude earthquake in Nepal highlights the critical importance of effective civil-military coordination to help those in harm’s way; however, it also highlights the challenges of harnessing the digital humanitarian revolution to improve responses to natural disasters and complex emergencies. With over 8,600 people killed and 8.1 million people affected (over one quarter of Nepal’s population), the international humanitarian community responded to the earthquake, but still required significant logistical and transportation support from regional and international militaries. The “digital humanitarian community” also sprang into action, using informal communication technologies (ICTs), including crowdsourcing, social media, and numerous platforms to facilitate information collection, fusion, and sharing. These included systems, applications, and software that helped enable the verification of individuals’ safety, identification and reconnec-
tion of missing persons, the provision of aerial imagery from satellites or UAVs, and the mapping of terrain, infrastructure damage, internally displaced persons camps and other humanitarian needs. This proliferation of digital action, with the aim of supporting the humanitarian response on the ground, highlights dramatic changes in the information environment for humanitarian responses since the 2010 Haiti earthquake. What remains to be seen, however, is how humanitarian and military responders - each with their own systems and methodologies for information sharing and technological coor-
dination - can leverage this digital revolution towards more effective civil-military coordination in emergency responses and disaster relief operations.
and military circles. This coordination becomes even more difficult during large-scale emergencies and conflicts. Coordination efforts are critical to protect non-combatants from armed attack. Despite significant advances over the past decade in improving these systems, many militaries struggles to keep up with the overwhelming flow of information from a variety of sources, including social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube), SMS texts (with photos and videos), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and commercial high-resolution satellite imagery provided by companies like Skybox Imaging and DigitalGlobe. The ability to collect, process, analyze, and ultimately disseminate this information across decision-makers for use in humanitarian responses is an easy task.

A Digital Revolution in Humanitarian Information Sharing and Coordination

Patrick Meier’s recently released book, “Digital Humanitarians,” exceptionally describes the rapidly changing landscape and dynamic nature of information gathering and sharing within the humanitarian community. The proliferation of “big data” across mobile platforms worldwide provides an overwhelming flow of information from a variety of sources, including social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube), SMS texts (with photos and videos), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and commercial high-resolution satellite imagery provided by companies like Skybox Imaging and DigitalGlobe. The ability to collect, process, analyze, and ultimately disseminate this information across decision-makers for use in humanitarian responses is an easy task.

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) will modify its existing disaster coordination platform, the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS), and its resident Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (VOSOCC). There are a number of highly interactive internet-based coordination and mapping tools that do not easily integrate and possibly more reliable computer systems. Furthermore, the aforementioned systems, whereas the humanitarian response community, in stark contrast to the military and government systems, making collaboration difficult across the civil-military divide. With the exception of formal alliances (e.g., NATO), most militaries operate their own independent communica- tion systems that do not easily integrate with other nations’ systems. Furthermore, the aforementioned revolution in ICTs in the humanitarian response community over the past few years is quickly altering the way responses are coordinated and managed. Most of these technologies have not yet fully responded to humanitarian crises and have struggled to keep up with the tremendous pace of change across the ICT environment.

On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (VOSOCC) also result in faster and better targeting of the humanitarian ICTs in order to improve the overall effectiveness and efficiency of civil-military coordination. Furthermore, both militaries and humanitarian organizations must figure out how to harness and integrate the myriad new ICTs to facilitate the delivery of effective humanitarian responses. The move towards more common and streamlined use of ICTs for information sharing and coordination will not only enhance the organization and efficiency of civil-military responses, but could also help to improve and better target humanitarian responses where and when they are needed most.

The following four recommendations may improve the effectiveness of civil-military information sharing and coordination in future emergencies:

**Training and Education:** Provide militaries with education...
and training on existing and emerg-
ing humanitarian ICTs, and humani-
tarian organizations with a better un-
derstanding of military capabilities. While this may sound like a daunting task, efforts are already underway at places like the U.S. Naval War College (NWC), where a partner-
ship with the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) allows an exchange of faculty and ideas, influencing curriculum taught to both U.S. and international military officers, as well as humanitarian leaders and re-
sponders. The Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA) also runs several courses to better educate military personnel. UNOCHA’s Civil-Military Section is another key organization that offers training to international military officers, as well as humanitarian organizations and militaries together to practice and learn how to better share information and coordinate their responses. This can occur through in-person at workshops and conferences, or online, during online fora, to explore current and future trends in humanitarian response and dis-
cuss more innovative and efficacious ways of working together. Informed by research, this routine exchange of ideas amongst humanitarian re-
sponders from all sectors – including NGOs, governments, academia, and militaries – can further build trust and confidence and help ensure that when we meet to address the next complex disaster, we will respond in a more collabora-
tive, synchronized, and effec-
tive manner, using ICTs to their fullest potential.

Common Understanding of the Current Situation

Explore the possibility of developing one integrated sys-
tem across humanitarian and military actors for information sharing and communication during emergency response. The rapid proliferation of digi-
tal humanitarian efforts and technologies necessitates the creation of a joint clearinghouse to coordinate and connect the specific needs of emergency responders – both humanitarian and military – with the efforts of digital humanitar-
ian. While numerous new ICTs will undoubtedly be developed and uti-
lized across the humanitarian space in the future, there is a critical need for leadership in coordinating civil, military and “digital” humanitarian efforts. Challenges notwithstanding, if key actors can agree to direct the majority of their situational aware-
ness-building activities to a central, UNOCHA-endorsed platform, all responders may have a more accu-
rate and timely understanding of the current environment on the ground during complex emergencies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Audience</th>
<th>Course Goals</th>
<th>Length</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Staff Worker Course</td>
<td>International Military</td>
<td>Enables participants, officers and NCOs, who are or will be appointed as CIMIC Staff Workers, to conduct CIMIC activities across the full spectrum of military engagement in a modern operational environment, up to and including corps/component command level</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Field Worker Course</td>
<td>Humanitarians</td>
<td>Enables participants, officers and NCOs, assigned as CIMIC Field Workers, to conduct CIMIC activities across the full spectrum of military engagement in a modern operational environment, up to and including corps/component command level</td>
<td>10 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States Agency for International Development Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Affairs (USAID/OFDA)</td>
<td>Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (J HOC)</td>
<td>Any U.S. military, DOD civilian or contractor</td>
<td>Highlights the role of USAID/OFDA as the lead federal agency for U.S. disaster response, and explains the process of requesting of US DOD assets in support of foreign disaster operations.</td>
<td>2 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Civil-Military Centre</td>
<td>Civil-Military Leaders’ Workshop</td>
<td>Senior government and nongovernment officials from the Asia-Pacific region</td>
<td>Facilitates high-level collaboration in multinational responses to conflicts and disasters</td>
<td>2 days</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)</td>
<td>U.N. Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) Course</td>
<td>International &quot;action-officer&quot; level humanitarians and military planners</td>
<td>Improves responsiveness, effectiveness, efficiency of humanitarian relief operations and advocates for the use of and adherence to guidelines for the use of MCPA in disasters</td>
<td>4 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)</td>
<td>Supporting Humanitarian Action in Responding to Emergencies and Disasters (SHARED) Course</td>
<td>International Military</td>
<td>Improves effectiveness of humanitarian action in natural disasters and complex emergencies where military forces are present, by providing knowledge and understanding that enable them to provide the right support at right time to right people in appropriate manner</td>
<td>3 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Health Emergencies in Large Populations (H.E.L.P.)</td>
<td>U.S. and international military personnel and civilians with backgrounds in public health, medicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster management</td>
<td>Provides participants with an understanding of the major public health issues to be addressed among populations affected by natural and man-made disasters and conflicts</td>
<td>10 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART)</td>
<td>U.S. and international military, DOD civilians and contractors; priority to deploying U.S. personnel or those supporting deploying personnel</td>
<td>Enhances the ability of the military to plan and execute disaster response operations in a multinational environment</td>
<td>2-4 days</td>
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</table>
Worker Course, open to international military, and a Field Worker Course open to humanitarians. The institution is an NATO-accredited training institution and hosts other course on civil-military coordination. Other institutions like the Australian Civil-Military Centre also teach a selection of these courses.

- Civil-Military Leaders’ Workshop at the Australian Civil-Military Centre. This workshop targets senior government and nongovernment officials from the Asia-Pacific region and has been offered since February 2014. The workshop facilitates high-level collaboration in multinational responses to conflicts and disasters.

- The Joint Humanitarian Operations Course (JHOC) is a two-day live course, developed by USAID/OFDA. The course is given to military personnel. Any military organization, to include civilian and contractor personnel, can attend, as well as specific, requesting units. The key point of JHOC is to highlight the role of USAID/OFDA as the lead federal agency for U.S. disaster response.

- The U.N. Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) Course is aimed at an international military and civilian audience. The course is open to national and international institutions [e.g. RedR Australia and the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA)], also host the course. The course is aimed at improving the efficiency of humanitarian operations and concentrates on civil-military coordination in disasters and complex emergencies. The audience is half-civilian (humanitarian community / government disaster management organizations) and half military. OCHA also sets a 20 percent minimum female participation in the course. The CMCoord audience is the most diverse of all the courses.

- Supporting Humanitarian Action in Responding to Emergencies and Disasters (SHARED) Course is also an UNOCHA program. It is designed for international military personnel who may be tasked to respond to emergencies (natural disasters and complex emergencies), and also for key personnel of military training institutions and peacekeeping training centers. OCHA conducts this course as requested by a specific country.

- The Health Emergencies in Large Populations (H.E.L.P.) Course, offered by CFE-DMHA is a two-week course, providing participants with an understanding of the major public health issues to be addressed among populations affected by natural and man-made disasters and conflicts. The course is open to national and international military personnel as well as civilians with backgrounds in public health, medicine, humanitarian assistance and disaster management.

- The Humanitarian Assistance Response Training (HART) Course, also offered by CFE-DMHA, is geared toward U.S. and international military, DOD civilians and contractors. Priority is given to deploying U.S. personnel or those supporting deploying personnel. The aim of the course is to enhance the ability of the military to plan and execute disaster response operations in a multinational, multiagency environment.

Creating an effective civil-military cooperation education system still remains a difficult task. However, the quality of educational courses in improving steadily, since lessons learned from disaster relief operations are incorporated into course curricula. Considering the different doctrines and goals of humanitarian and military forces, the wide variety of training and education opportunities available is providing both civilian and military actors with a sound basic training and education to effectively respond to natural disasters.

Over the last 15 years, the landscape of disaster management and humanitarian assistance has changed substantially. Improvements in education for both NGOs and military personnel, better coordination of relief efforts in disaster responses, and changes in military doctrine have reduced the military footprint in disaster management and humanitarian assistance operations. The military’s unique capabilities (logistics, including strategic air lift and rotary wing lift, infrastructure repair, imagery, command and control, and communications) can be brought to bear very rapidly and in austere environments – more so than civilian counterparts – still play an important role in those operations, but the ways in which those capabilities are being incorporated has become more consistent. As education and training opportunities increase in the future, the quality of those programs will improve as lessons learned from previous HA/DR operations are incorporated in the curriculums. The participants will be able to better define the role they want to play in disaster situations, the need for specific skills will be better described, and the moving pieces will be better coordinated; all in all, improved civil-military coordination education has the power to increase disaster response capabilities of all disaster response stakeholders.

International military personnel take the Civil-Military Cooperation (CMIC) Staff Worker Course at the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence; U.S. military and Department of Defense personnel attend the Joint Humanitarian Operations Course.
Despite that the foundations of international humanitarian law are more than 150 years old, tensions among military actors, government civilians and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) regarding the provision of humanitarian relief during conflict and peace time emergencies.

Since the middle of the 20th century, tensions have been fueled by increased military participation in relief activities both within and beyond conflict, to include responses to natural disasters. Some argue that military participation in multinational disaster relief scenarios is not problematic because of the apolitical atmosphere. Others view overreliance on military assets during disaster relief as intensifying the humanitarian community’s problems of independence and impartiality because the global public sees the two communities working together in one operation and presumes they will be cooperating in others, including conflict.

Notwithstanding the political debate on whether the military should participate in disaster response, the fact remains that military forces are involved in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR). Civilian agencies and humanitarian actors have been attempting – with varying levels of success – to adapt their own responses in order to garner the best levels of cooperation. They can from military actors and to reduce the risks to civilians during relief operations in contested or insecure environments.

In the early years of U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, military and humanitarian actors were fumbling their way forward on how best to perform humanitarian relief tasks amidst varying levels of conflict. Although Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and cross-U.N. integration were tried, they proved less than optimal, and the U.S. armed forces continued to unilaterally undertake aid and development activities that blurred the lines between military and humanitarian actors. Humanitarian actors argued that this type of military involvement not only increased the physical security risks of humanitarian actors (who could be mistaken for soldiers in disguise), but also led to duplication of efforts and tension continues to color the relationship.

In 2003, the U.S.-based consortium of NGOs, InterAction, was loudly pressing for U.S. government and military agencies and NGOs to participate jointly in policy reviews, and educational and training reforms to revive a climate of “cultural exchange” that they contended had existed in the 1990s. They pointed to a time when – they said – members of the armed forces, NGO staffs and policy-makers underwent training and exercises together to become familiar with each other’s roles and goals in both conflict and non-conflict operations.

InterAction was not alone in noting the strained relationships that had evolved from the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions, nor in linking these strains to a decrease in coordinated training. Wheeler and Harmer (2006) underscored that tensions between NGOs and military/political actors peaked when U.S. administration officials cited NGOs as “force multipliers” and military forces in Afghanistan began delivering aid. Indeed, during the early years of Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF), then U.S. Agency for International Development Director Andrew Natsios told U.S.-based NGOs working in Afghanistan that they should identify themselves more explicitly in the field as having received U.S. funding in order to bolster recipient perceptions that the U.S. intervention was constructive. These overt efforts to incorporate NGOs’ operations and efforts into the political objectives of military interventions triggered debate over U.S. and international policy and guidance regarding civilian and military integration in complex emergencies.

With relationships between civilian and military actors...
The earthquake response included not only emergency humanitarian relief but also assistance in restoring political institutions and development planning. The immediate challenges to the relief effort were shortages in transportation and limited communications systems, both of which became priorities of concern related to the earthquake's magnitude and the lack of authority or capacity, but also assistance in restoring political institutions and development planning. The Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) stood up in late January, and then an UNOCHA Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) team convened. However, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), U.S. Southern Command (US南), and Canadian armed forces were already operating in partnership with civilian counterparts without going through UNOCHA. Global and local actors were able to overcome immediate transportation and communication challenges through coordination, but the hodgepodge solutions employed were not documented into lessons learned that led to a more coordinated and integrated effort. In part, the problem lay in the national government’s lack of political legitimacy and overall lack of authority or capacity, but after-action assessments also found fault in the weak leadership of the national government's lack of authority or capacity, but also assistance in restoring political institutions and development planning.

The global partners’ inability or unwillingness to communicate, and the national Haitian leadership’s decision not to support InterAction’s coordination that pre-disaster exposure and education can overcome in emergency challenges and in-contacts. Indeed, the 2010 Haitian earthquakes stand in stark contrast to after-action reviews of the multinational response to Typhoon Haiyan where many of the actors had standing relationships or had trained together in the conduct of disaster response operations.

The context within which the quake struck was one of poverty and political instability. The upshot was that the earthquake response included not only emergency humanitarian relief but also assistance in restoring political institutions and development planning.

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting-Plus Experts' Working Group on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Table-top Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations 22nd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies &amp; CFE-DMHA Health Emergencies in Large Populations (H.E.L.P.) Course</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Multinational Communications Interoperability Program Pacific Endeavor Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 46th Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General World Humanitarian Summit Global Consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations 3rd ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (3rd ADMM-Plus)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General World Humanitarian Summit</td>
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