CIMIC and PRT Operations in ISAF

The recommendations included in this report require endorsement by the Strategic Commands and/or its principal customer. To know which recommendations have been endorsed, please contact SHAPE J7 or HQ SACT, LL Core Team or check the NATO Lessons Learned Database.
FOREWORD FROM THE DIRECTOR

I am pleased to forward this report on CIMIC and PRT operations in ISAF. The production of this report has been based on an extensive period in theatre collating information from a wide variety of sources. It has benefitted from Command Group support within HQ ISAF and, I consider, provides an accurate reflection of the Civil-Military situation in Afghanistan.

During the production of this report, changes to the ISAF operation made some elements of the original analysis requirement redundant. With the agreement of the customers, the scope of the analysis was modified to best address the core issues affecting the success of CIMIC and PRT in Afghanistan. JALLC has attempted to provide an overview of current PRT activities and approaches and to identify actions that NATO could take to ensure PRT operations fully support the ISAF mission and ultimately meet Afghanistan's security and development needs effectively.

NATO's commitment to the Afghan National Development Strategy and effective interaction at all levels with the Afghan development stakeholders are needed to maintain a coherent approach to address the international community's mission in Afghanistan. Maintaining the correct balance of civilian and military capabilities within a PRT is an enabler for ISAF mission success; PRTs are the primary means for ISAF to interact with the Afghan population and the roles the PRTs fulfil within the community must reflect prevailing security and development conditions.

The preliminary findings from this analysis were presented to the ISAF PRT Conference in Dec 2007, JFC Brunssum in Dec 2007, and within the Enhanced CIMIC – Integrated Capability Team (EC-ICT) at ACT in Jan 2008. While this report was produced specifically at the request of SHAPE and JFC Brunssum, I would hope that the findings it presents can inform a wider audience, both inside and outside NATO.

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CIMIC and PRT Operations in ISAF

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Based on work from March 2007 to November 2007 at JALLC, JFC Brunssum, and NATO School Oberammergau and in Afghanistan.
MISSION

The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was tasked by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to prepare an analysis report on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Operations by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in support of analysis requirements submitted by SHAPE and Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum. The initially agreed Analysis Objective(s) were:

AO-1. Compare the existing NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-9) and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures with the CIMIC activities of ISAF (including the PRTs) and give some advantages and disadvantages in relation to Operation Plan (OPLAN) 30302. (Customer: SHAPE)

AO-2. To identify to COMJFC and COMISAF if the ISAF PRTs’ CIMIC activities are achieving the stated desired objectives and effects. (Customer: JFC Brunssum)

As a result of changes within ISAF, with the agreement of the customers, the scope of the analysis was modified to best address the core issues affecting the success of CIMIC and PRT in Afghanistan. As such, this report focuses on providing an overview of current PRT activities and approaches.

BACKGROUND

In the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, the international community agreed to support a transitional Afghan government in the development of Afghanistan towards a set of “Millennium Goals”. The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) established an internationally endorsed strategy to meet these goals. It is within this strategy that the UN gave the NATO-led ISAF the mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1510 to,

“…assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GOA) in the establishment of a secure environment within which International Organisations (IO) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) can provide reconstruction and development assistance.”

At the leading edge of NATO’s stability effort are PRTs. A PRT is an integrated military-civilian organisation, staffed and supported by ISAF member countries, operating at provincial level that is able, according to the ISAF PRT Handbook, to,

“…penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and economic components.”

As of late January 2007, there were 25 PRTs led by 13 different nations covering 31 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The military elements of all of these PRTs are united under COMISAF’s command (since the completion of ISAF expansion on 5 October 2006). The civilian elements of these PRTs are outside the ISAF command chain and

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1 The ANDS comprises 3-pillars—security, governance (including rule of law and human rights) and economic (and social) development. Each pillar encompasses one or more of eight sectors – in the case of the security pillar it contains a single sector (security). There are five crosscutting themes applicable to every pillar – for ISAF the most relevant are counter-narcotics and anti-corruption.
employ national resources, necessarily in accordance with national priorities. It is a continuing challenge for ISAF to achieve PRT coherency under these conditions. SHAPE and JFC Brunssum requested analysis to understand the role of PRTs in Afghanistan better. This report is the third JALLC analysis report focussed on the topic of PRTs.

**METHODOLOGY**

Data collection for this analysis began with a study of the relevant OPLAN series, NATO and UN documentation, and open source papers as well as attendance at various NATO training events and related conferences. Subsequently, all PRTs were invited to complete a survey concerning their doctrinal and operational influences and investigating their progress against some possible measures of mission success. 70% of questionnaires were returned. Represented in the returns were PRTs from nine out of the 13 PRT lead nations and from all Regional Commands (RC) that use PRTs. The information from the survey was used to inform the in-theatre interviews which took place over three months during visits to nine PRTs, all five RC locations, HQ ISAF and the offices of various International and Non-Governmental organisations. Interviews were conducted with key leadership figures including the NATO Senior Civilian Representative, members of the HQ ISAF command group, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's (UNAMA) Civil-Military Coordinator and Military Liaison Officer and the Director of Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief. All questionnaire and interview information was solicited on a non-attributable basis to encourage an honest and frank expression of opinion.

The nature of CIMIC operations means that the effects of PRT operations are mostly measured qualitatively and subjectively. Therefore, much of the data collected depended upon the perspectives of the contributing individuals. Advice from CIMIC Subject Matter Experts (SME) from both the CIMIC Group North (CIMIC Centre of Excellence) and from within the ISAF theatre, both military and civilian, was used to establish a balanced and authoritative baseline for this analysis.

**KEY CONCLUSIONS**

The key conclusions of this analysis are:

- The ANDS provides a key coherency mechanism that applies to ISAF, Afghan, governmental, international and non-governmental contributors.
- UNAMA is the UN mandated development coordinator and as such is a key international partner to ISAF. The ISAF-UNAMA relationship is not yet fully mature.
- ISAF unity of command is degraded by problems with formal Transfer of Authority (TOA) but this is not associated with reduced strength of ISAF influence at PRTs. The number of PRTs in which strong Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) influence exists appears to be less than many believe.
- Force levels at some PRTs are more dependent upon TCN policy than the security environment within which the PRT operates. This can have a negative impact upon the development of local security forces and hamper the establishment of an indigenously sustained stable and secure environment.
- Improved civil-military information exchange and sharing could be used to improve interaction and coherency between reconstruction and development
actors. ACT’s ongoing CIMIC Fusion Centre/Civil-Military Overview (CFC/CMO) experiment is a promising initiative in this area.

**KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The following recommendations arise from the key conclusions:

- ISAF needs to support and enable the ANDS process by ensuring local provincial Afghan leaders abide by the priorities within the strategy and by encouraging ISAF TCNs to implement policies that are consistent with and address the whole of the ANDS.

- NATO should work towards enabling UNAMA to fully assume its role through closer collaboration, both at operational and tactical levels.

- TOA of forces from TCNs to ISAF requires correct implementation. Nations should issue formal TOA messages on transfer of force elements to SACEUR. It is further recommended that JFC Brunssum periodically releases a TASKORG message confirming the ISAF command relationship

- The balance between civilian and military capabilities within PRTs should be regarded as fluid in order to correctly reflect the security environment and the development needs and means available to the local population.

- Subject to the success of the CMO/CFC experiment, means should be investigated to permit the transition from experiment to operational product.

The summary of these and additional recommendations arising from this analysis is presented in Chapter five of the main body.
Distribution

**Action:**
External:
COS ACO
COS ACT
COS JFC Brunssum
COM ISAF

**Information:**
External:
SHAPE ACOS J9
JWC
JFTC
CCOE
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Internal:
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JALLC Lessons Learned and Analysis Division
JALLC Production Branch
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Lesson Identified 2: Consistency of ISAF PRT Operations Between Provinces and Troop Contributing Nations
Lesson Identified 3: PRT Composition
Lesson Identified 4: Civil-Military Interaction
1. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan are joint military-civilian organisations operating within the provinces of Afghanistan, staffed and supported by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) member countries. Their role is stated in ISAF Operation Plan (OPLAN) 38302 (Reference A) as:

“PRTs are the leading edge of NATO’s stability effort, [...] The specific role of PRTs is to assist the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) to extend its authority across the country, through engaging with provincial leadership to support the growth of good governance and foster widespread support for security and development.”

2. On 5 October 2006, the ISAF mission, including PRT military elements, was transferred to NATO command, giving NATO the lead for the development of PRTs in Afghanistan. SHAPE and Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum requested analysis from the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) to understand the role of PRTs in Afghanistan better. This report is the third JALLC analysis report focussed on the topic of PRTs (previous reports are References B and C).

**ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES**

3. The AOs agreed by SHAPE and JFC Brunssum for this analysis were:

   **AO-1.** Compare the existing NATO Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) doctrine (AJP-9) and Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP) with the CIMIC activities of ISAF (including the PRTs) and give some advantages and disadvantages in relation to OPLAN 30302. (Customer: SHAPE)

   **AO-2.** To identify to Commander (COM) JFC Brunssum and COMISAF if the ISAF PRTs' CIMIC activities are achieving the stated desired objectives and effects. (Customer: JFC Brunssum)

4. For reasons described under Factors Affecting the Analysis, neither of the AOs could be fully completed. Accordingly, it was agreed that this analysis would focus on providing an overview of current PRT activities and approaches.

**PURPOSE OF THE REPORT**

5. This report is written to support SHAPE and JFC Brunssum with planning PRTs in Afghanistan. Although focussed on the customers’ needs, this report may inform the wider NATO community and non-NATO partners and organisations on the use of PRTs in future operations.

6. The observations in this report are at the strategic and operational levels. Some of the issues presented are already being addressed by NATO’s transformation activities, but many of them, though not new, continue to require attention.

7. This report is structured by chapter as follows:

   a. **Background:** introducing the internationally-agreed Afghan goals, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), ISAF and the PRTs.

   b. **Cooperation to support Afghan goals:** presenting observations on ISAF and the PRTs working together to achieve internationally-agreed Afghan goals.
c. **PRT Methodologies**: examining the different PRT approaches and how they impact on the PRTs’ ability to conduct their mission.

d. **Summary**: providing a list of the conclusions and recommendations arising from the analysis. Includes JALLC commentary on highlights found during the analysis.

e. ** Annexes**: providing supporting information. Annex E contains a list of those issues from the analysis considered appropriate for inclusion in the NATO Lessons Learned Database (and thus for NATO-wide sharing or formal consideration for action at the Bi-SC level as part of the Bi-SC Lessons Learned Process).

**METHODOLOGY**

8. Data collection for this analysis began with a study of the relevant OPLAN series, NATO and UN documentation, and open source papers as well as attendance at various NATO training events and related conferences. Subsequently, all PRTs were invited to complete a survey concerning their doctrinal and operational influences and investigating their progress against some possible measures of mission success. 70% of questionnaires were returned. Represented in the returns were PRTs from nine out of the 13 PRT lead nations and from all Regional Commands (RC) that use PRTs. The information from the survey was used to inform in-theatre interviews which took place over three months during visits to nine PRTs, all five RC locations, HQ ISAF and the offices of various International Organisations (IO) and NGOs. Interviews were conducted with key leadership figures including the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), members of the HQ ISAF command group, UNAMA’s Civil-Military Coordinator and Military Liaison Officer and the Director of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR). All questionnaire and interview information was solicited on a non-attributable basis to encourage honest answers.

9. The in-theatre collection team worked closely with the HQ ISAF CJ9 PRT engagement teams to coordinate visits to maximise data-gathering opportunities while minimizing the impact upon the RCs’ and PRTs’ operational rhythm. The relatively long period spent in theatre, when compared with other JALLC analyses, provided the opportunity to inform the analysis further through informal discussions with many civilian members of NGOs and other non-military parties involved in Afghan development.

10. Much of the data collected was qualitative and subjective, that is, it depended upon the judgements and opinions of the contributing individuals. Advice from both military and civilian CIMIC Subject Matter Experts (SME) in CIMIC Group North (CIMIC Centre of Excellence) and the ISAF theatre was used to validate this type of data for use in analysis.

**FACTORS AFFECTING THE ANALYSIS**

11. The OPLAN comparison task at AO-1 became redundant when JFC Brunssum initiated the development of OPLAN 30302 Rev 3 (revision of Reference D). JALLC provided JFC Brunssum with input to this OPLAN revision based on early findings from this study.

12. It was considered inappropriate to progress analysis relating to Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness under AO-2 as the ISAF Combined Joint Effects Tasking Order (CJETO) process – introduced after agreement of the AOs but before field data collection commenced – partially met AO-2. The subsequent completion of the Quarterly Effects Assessment reports for all five RCs in October 2007 made AO-2 entirely redundant. It was agreed with JFC Brunssum CJ9 that instead the
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The JALLC project team received the full support of the HQ ISAF Command Group and HQ ISAF CJ9. The team were given access to PRTs, RCs, HQ ISAF and IO leadership and embedded within the PRT Engagement Team (PET) where they benefited from logistical support and PRT SME experience.

Transportation and accessibility problems prevented visits to two US PRTs and data collection at RC East was curtailed because the Command Group was not available for interview. This meant that it was not possible to collect all planned interview data from US PRTs but it was still possible to take the views of US PRTs into account by using PRT analysis conducted by the US Army Centre for Lessons Learned (CALL) (Reference E) and data from PRT questionnaire responses.

OTHER FACTORS OBSERVED

Effects Based Approach to Operations should not be used in ISAF but was being used

There is no NATO Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) doctrine (only a pre-doctrinal handbook (Reference F)). Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), in a letter to COM JFC Brunssum (Reference G), instructed NATO organisations, to “refrain from any premature or unilateral implementation activity,” with respect to EBAO, which he argued, would put the EBAO concept in danger of failing, both within ISAF and within NATO unless all players (from the strategic to the tactical commanders) understand and implement a common EBAO methodology.

However, ISAF is using an EBAO methodology as described in CJETO 001-10 (Reference H) where it is stated that;

“ISAF X will use an Effects Based Approach to Operations [in order to] gain a more detailed understanding of the operating environment thereby allowing more comprehensive and appropriate responses to be developed. An Effects Based Approach also enables ISAF to better link strategic and operational objectives with operational and tactical tasks. The CJETO is ISAF’s capstone planning directive that provides the framework within which operational plans in HQ ISAF and in the Regional Commands (RCs) are to be developed.”

The UNDSS Accessibility Map is one potential measure of ISAF mission success

The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) regularly produces UN Programme Accessibility Maps which depict, by district in Afghanistan, the degree of risk for which UN agencies should plan. Not solely a security picture, they take into account a range of political, environmental and security factors and indicate how accessible Afghanistan is to the UN and other development providers.

A comparison of the June 2005, June 2006 and September 2007 maps showed a marked trend towards more risk (Figure 1).
20. Conducting a Wilcoxon Ranked Pairs Test on the data established that in many cases, including when considering data across the whole country, there was strong statistical evidence to support a year-on-year increase in risk as shown in Table 1.

21. This increase in risk for UN development providers suggests that ISAF is not succeeding in its role of promoting a secure environment for development.

22. The UN’s assessment has been criticised both within ISAF and by various civilian organisations as being politicised, based on limited information and being at odds with ISAF J2’s security assessments. Nevertheless, the development providers’ perceived level of risk reflects how secure the environment is and therefore how successful the ISAF mission has been. Therefore, the UNDSS Accessibility Map is one potential measure of overall ISAF mission success.

Table 1: Statistical evidence of increase in risk by region

<table>
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<th>Increase in Risk</th>
<th>June 05 to June 06</th>
<th>June 06 to September 07</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Strong evidence</td>
<td>Strong evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Strong evidence</td>
<td>Strong evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Strong evidence</td>
<td>No real evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Suggestive evidence</td>
<td>Little evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Suggestive evidence</td>
<td>No real evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>Strong evidence</td>
<td>Strong evidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Average UN Accessibility June 05 – September 07.
23. In the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 (Reference I), the international community agreed to support a transitional Afghan government in the development of Afghanistan towards the Millennium Development Goals. This political agreement was renewed and updated in the Afghan Compact. The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)\(^1\) (Reference J) laid out the strategic priorities and mechanisms to reach the Millennium Development Goals and was published in interim version, the ANDS, in December 2005.

24. In accordance with the Afghan Compact, UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) were published directing UNAMA and ISAF to:

   a. UNAMA (Reference K):
   
   “…manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with the International community.”

   b. ISAF (Reference L):
   
   “Assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the establishment of a secure environment within which International Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations can provide reconstruction and development assistance.”

25. As part of ISAF’s effort, joint military-civilian PRTs were set up. Their terms of reference were established by the PRT Executive Steering Committee (PRT ESC)\(^2\) at the beginning of 2005 to:

   a. PRT (ISAF OPLAN 30302 (Reference D)):
   
   “…assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified areas of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”

26. PRTs operate within the provinces of Afghanistan to conduct tactical level civil-military interaction with both Afghan and IO/NGO partners, to provide security assistance and to conduct development projects using national funds where the security situation prevents Afghan organisations or IOs/NGOs from doing so.

27. The military elements of PRTs are national contributions to ISAF and fall under COMISAF’s command. The civilian elements of PRTs are generally drawn from national government ministries and IOs and remain under national direction. A PRT’s military-civilian composition defines its capabilities. As stated in the ISAF PRT handbook (Reference M), a PRT is able to:

   “…penetrate the more unstable and insecure areas because of its military component and is able to stabilize these areas because of the combined capabilities of its diplomacy, military, and economic components.”

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\(^1\) The ANDS comprises 3-pillars—security, governance (including rule of law and human rights) and economic (and social) development. Each pillar encompasses one or more of eight sectors—in the case of the security pillar it contains a single sector (security). There are five crosscutting themes applicable to every pillar including counter-narcotics and anti-corruption.

\(^2\) The PRT ESC is an ambassadorial level committee chaired by the Afghan Interior Ministry with representation from all PRT contributing nations and ISAF.
Cooperation to Support Afghan Goals

28. The NATO Secretary General referred to the need for international security and development contributors in Afghanistan to work together at the Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers with ISAF contributors on 24 October 2007 when he stated that:

“...this is a team effort. NATO alone all by itself cannot help Afghanistan build lasting peace. We can only succeed if we all, civilian and military alike, pull our weight and pull together.”

29. This chapter presents observations relating to ISAF and PRTs working together and contributing to the wider international community effort in Afghanistan. The following seven topics are covered:

   a. ISAF compliance with the ANDS
   b. Means of providing development funding
   c. Operational level development fund
   d. Military interaction with IOs/NGOs
   e. ISAF partnership with UNAMA
   f. Unity of command
   g. Use of NATO CIS

ISAF COMPLIANCE WITH THE ANDS

30. The ANDS applies equally to civilian and military contributors in Afghanistan and, if universally followed, is designed to drive all activities in Afghanistan towards the internationally-agreed Afghan Millennium Development Goals.

31. NATO and ISAF support the ANDS in the ISAF OPLAN series and the majority of ISAF contributors try to adhere to the ANDS. However, some nations have discarded it as being unworkable, arguing that it was created without reference to the means available to reach the desired goals. At least one PRT is working to a national plan for their province and some nations have unilaterally opted out of selected elements of the ANDS. For example, one nation has opted out of the Counter Narcotics cross-cutting theme from the ANDS. Despite COM ISAF direction, the ANDS is not being universally followed within ISAF.

32. Divergence from the ANDS by some ISAF contributors may cause some ISAF actions to not contribute to or even to hinder achievement of the ANDS. Therefore, as long as some ISAF contributors are not fully committed to the ANDS, ISAF cannot fully commit either.

FUNDING

Means of Providing Development Funding

33. Most development funding from nations takes one of the following four routes;

   a. National route: through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) to the GOA; the money cascades through the relevant ministries through the Provincial
Governor to fund projects prioritised through the Provincial Development Plan (PDP) process.

b. **Provincial route**: through the Provincial Governor’s Office.

c. **PRT route**: directly to the PRT.

d. **Direct route**: directly to contractors outside of the GOA structures.

34. The national route, the ARTF, is a World Bank-monitored trust fund that provides the GOA with funding support for its National Priority Programmes. It is the World Bank’s preferred means of providing development funding and the World Bank is critical of nations that provide funding via the other means above (Reference N). It argues that the other means do not encourage the GOA to improve its financial systems and hamper the long-term development of GOA’s governance structure.

35. ISAF Troop Contributing Nations’ (TCN) representatives invariably stated that providing development funding through the ARTF was their preferred route but that they don’t always use it because it is not always possible to provide development funding expeditiously using this process. The following examples illustrate some of the means of providing development funding currently in use:

a. Some nations successfully use the ARTF by earmarking funds to a particular province and proactively expediting money through the Afghan system using embassy staff in Kabul with good communications to their PRT.

b. Some nations do not use the ARTF at all and provide funding provincially, directly to their PRT or by direct contracting in the field.

c. One nation, that cannot use the ARTF because the ARTF does not satisfy its national budgetary oversight requirements, has established an alternative system to ensure Afghan involvement while retaining direct national control of the expenditure. Under this nation’s system, each project is proposed to a committee comprising four Afghans and four representatives from donor nation ministries. Projects need five votes to progress—requiring support from both the Afghans and the donors and permitting a veto by either. Projects receiving eight votes are automatically approved. Projects receiving between five and seven votes are then prioritised according to how many votes they received and how important they are. Projects that are part of the PDP, have long-term benefit, address female issues, influence multiple communities and satisfy donor-funding oversight criteria are of high importance.

36. Although the ARTF is the preferred development funding route of both the World Bank and the ISAF contributing nations, it is not always being used. If the ARTF is to be used to full effect, then the reasons why nations are not using it need to be properly investigated and dealt with. Any solution developed could be informed by nations’ current experiences of providing development funding in Afghanistan.

**Operational Level Development Fund**

37. At times, there is an urgent need to fund development projects that are directly related to the security operation but do not meet the qualification criteria of COMISAF’s operational funding sources. This happened with the repair of Highway-1 in Zabul province. The road had been damaged by bad weather and its condition was deteriorating rapidly. It needed to be repaired immediately. GOA funding was not

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3 Highway-1 is the principal ring road and is of strategic importance to the country; it is also a main supply route (MSR) for ISAF operations.
accessible within the required time-scale and IO/NGO or national funding could not be
secured. Funding was requested from the Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund,
which required the consent of the donor nations, but was denied as it did not meet the
fund’s criteria (Reference O). Funding was eventually provided by the US
Commander’s Emergency Relief Project budget – a national fund for the support of the
US military working alongside ISAF in Afghanistan.

38. In this example, the process of identifying potential funding sources and then
requesting and awaiting a decision for allocation of funds from each source was very
time consuming and the time taken could have become unacceptable, as the longer
the project remained on hold pending a funding decision, the greater the risk to the
ISAF mission became.

39. If ISAF is to avoid delays in funding development projects that are urgently
needed to support the ISAF missions then COMISAF needs faster access to funding
for this purpose. A possible way to achieve this may be by providing COMISAF with
his own source of funding for urgent projects that have a direct impact upon mission
success.

40. In a separate but related issue, staff officers within HQ ISAF suggested that if
COMISAF were to be allocated his own funding source, that source might be further
expanded to balance funding available to PRTs. The idea was that if all nations gave
their PRT development budgets to NATO, NATO could then distribute them more
evenly and consistently across theatre. However, this suggestion would add another
funding route that bypasses the GOA to those presented above and is therefore
unlikely to be preferred by either ISAF TCNs or the World Bank.

**MILITARY INTERACTION WITH IOs/NGOs**

41. NATO and ISAF are interacting with IOs/NGOs for a number of reasons and in a
number of ways.

42. IOs and NGOs do not always welcome interaction from the military. They
repeatedly cite a need to distance themselves from the military to safeguard their
impartiality and to protect their workers. Their view is that, should they become tainted
by association with ISAF forces, they will not be trusted by the local population and this
could place their projects and personnel at risk. The Afghan NGO Security
Organization (ANSO) expressed this concern directly to COM ISAF.

43. In response to ANSO’s concerns, ISAF issued guidance (Reference P) on how to
interact with NGOs. This guidance was found to have effectively reached PRTs as
every PRT visited had a clear understanding of the need for IOs/NGOs to maintain
their distance from the military. In addition, NATO now involves IO and NGO
representatives in NATO seminars and training to improve mutual understanding of
working practices.

44. NATO is also supporting efforts to improve civil-military interaction by developing
civil-military information exchange mechanisms and including IOs/NGOs in military
planning processes:

   a. **Civil-Military Information Exchange**: ACT is developing the CIMIC Fusion Centre
      (CFC) and Civil Military Overview (CMO) concepts. The CFC is an information and
      knowledge management organisation that enables Reach Back to resources and
      expertise in military and civilian organisations and the CMO is a web-based portal to
      share information in a user-friendly way. The CFC and CMO are complementary to
      an existing civil-military information exchange mechanism, the Afghanistan Country
Stability Picture (ACSP)\(^4\), in that data drawn from ACSP will have value added by the CFC prior to being promulgated via the CMO. The CFC and CMO concepts are being tested in an experiment in Afghanistan. Early indications from the experiment suggest that the CFC and CMO are already becoming important civil-military information exchange mechanisms. Should the CFC/CMO experiment prove successful and CFC/CMO develop into valuable means to facilitate civil-military information exchange then withdrawing CFC/CMO at the end of the experiment period (scheduled for February 2009) is likely to have a negative impact on relationships between NATO and the users of the CMO interface and the Afghan and IO/NGO communities' perception of NATO may deteriorate. If CFC and CMO prove to be successful then, at the end of their experiment period, they should be turned directly into operational products with as little disruption in service to theatre users as possible.

b. Involving IOs/NGOs in ISAF development planning process: At present, IO/NGO influence on and involvement in ISAF development planning process is disproportionately low in relation to their development spending – The World Bank estimates 75-80% of development funding is from NGOs (Reference N). Many of the relationships needed to improve this balance have been established in a series of in-theatre committees and working groups but little concrete progress in establishing effective synchronisation of development planning processes was observed.

45. Despite NATO’s efforts to improve ISAF’s interaction with IOs/NGOs described above, ISAF PRTs are still repeatedly criticised for over-stepping their mandate in open source reports. For example, Barbara Stapleton\(^5\) claimed that “PRTs were never mandated, constructed or intended to afford direct protection to Afghan civilians, or, for that matter, other development actors.” (Reference Q). Many of the strongest criticisms relate to PRT leadership of development projects in place of local or NGO management. It is a widely accepted view that, if development projects are to be seen as led by Afghan organisations or IOs/NGOs, this would improve the local population’s perception of the ability of the GOA to provide for their needs and so this is the preferred approach to delivering development. However, where the security situation is too bad to allow this to happen, PRTs provide development projects.

46. There are some examples of PRTs leading development projects which may have been better led by Afghan organisations or IOs/NGOs. Some reasons why this may be happening were observed:

a. Successful PRT-led development projects are believed to improve the local population’s perception of the military.

b. Media reports of successful development projects led by PRTs often serve to justify those PRTs’ existence within the home nation. At one PRT, which has been successful at promoting significant development within a very high threat environment through mentoring and facilitating both international and Afghan government organisation/NGOs, a lack of tangible evidence of direct PRT success—such as PRT prominence in media coverage of project opening ceremonies—had led the TCN to consider withdrawing their PRT contribution.

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\(^4\) The ACSP is an ISAF-produced database of ongoing and completed development projects provided by GOA, ISAF and IOs/NGOs that is being transferred to GOA control as part of the Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS) programme. The ACSP will be accessible via a web-based interface.

\(^5\) Although writing in her personal capacity, Barbara Stapleton was a POLAD in the office of the EU Special Representative to Afghanistan.
c. PRTs often have significant construction capability available to them, from collocated combat engineers, for example. It is often more expeditious and simpler, to use these capabilities rather than establish relationships and mentor projects led by Afghans or NGOs, despite the more enduring and long-term benefits associated with Afghan ownership of projects.

47. NATO has already shown a commitment to improving its ability to interact with IOs/NGOs and needs to ensure that successful initiatives continue to be supported. But additional actions are needed if NATO wishes to fully synchronise PRTs and IOs/NGOs development planning and overcome the criticisms it faces for using PRTs to lead projects which may be better led by Afghan organisations or IOs/NGOs.

**HARMONISATION WITH UNAMA**

48. In September 2007, UNSCR 1776 (Reference R) prolonged the ISAF mission through 2008 and noted the need for further sustained cooperation, coordination and mutual support between UNAMA and ISAF:

“Stressing the central role that the UN continues to play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan, noting, in the context of a comprehensive approach the synergies in the objectives of UNAMA and of ISAF, and stressing the need for further sustained cooperation, coordination and mutual support, taking due account of their respective designated responsibilities,…”

49. UNAMA is inherently aligned with ISAF as, by mandate, they share a common goal to support GOA. However, inconsistent views regarding UNAMA’s willingness to associate with ISAF were reported. On one hand, UN agencies, as noted in the section on military interaction with IOs/NGOs above, typically distance themselves from military forces, citing the need for impartiality and to reduce the risk to their employees by association. On the other hand, during interviews at UNAMA field offices, UNAMA representatives expressed a keen desire to liaise with the PRT.

50. In the PRT questionnaire returns, there was general agreement (from 68% of PRTs that had an UNAMA office in their province) that a good relationship existed with UNAMA which benefited development in the province. However, in interviews, PRTs complained of a lack of UNAMA capability and an unwillingness of UNAMA to assume a lead role for development coordination. In one reported situation, UNAMA could not or would not take the lead for mentoring provincial development mechanisms when requested to by a PRT. Interviews with senior UNAMA personnel revealed that UNAMA capability is reduced because UNAMA is 23% under-staffed.

51. Although a generally good relationship between PRTs and UNAMA exists, the full synergies envisaged by the UN between ISAF and UNAMA have yet to come to fruition.

52. Discussions were held in theatre with interested parties to explore means to enhance the relationship between ISAF and UNAMA. It was suggested that ISAF and UNAMA could exploit opportunities to fuse situational awareness and share ISAF communications and force protection capabilities. For instance, collocating UNAMA offices with PRTs in areas designated as high risk by UNAMA security advisors would allow UNAMA to share ISAF’s force protection capability. Another suggestion was to include a UNAMA coordination element in HQ ISAF and UNAMA liaison officers in the PRTs.
PRT OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE AND COMMAND

53. The ISAF SCR and COM JFC Brunssum both expressed concern that the mechanisms in place to ensure coherence among PRTs and their activities were not working as envisaged:

a. In a recent special report (Reference S), SCR noted that:

“Unfortunately the past has shown that the PRT WG\(^6\) under the chairmanship of the [Ministry of the Interior] has not been able to be productive and thus not been able to allow the ESC to play the executive role, as envisaged. This has resulted in decreasing interest in the work of the bodies and thus resulted in less emphasis on creating and ensuring coherence among the PRTs and their activities.”

b. In a letter from COM JFC Brunssum to SACEUR following a theatre orientation visit (Reference T), he stated;

“It is my belief that a significant number of PRT Leaders are reporting directly to their national ministries with ISAF reporting only taking place by serendipity or pragmatic necessity. This approach is weakening ISAF’s in-theatre unity of effort and undermining progress towards achievement of the goals articulated in the Interim Afghan National Development Strategy\(^7\). And, ultimately the precedence of national agendas over a broader coherency of activities may prove detrimental to ISAF achieving its mission.”

54. TCNs should perform Transfer of Authority (TOA) of PRTs with a minimum of Operational Control (OPCON) to COMISAF via SACEUR and JFC Brunssum in accordance with SACEUR’s OPLAN (Reference U) and agreed NATO procedures. COMISAF, in the ISAF OPLAN (Reference A) and subsequent TASKORG diagram regularly published on the ISAF website, then allocates PRTs at Tactical Command (TACOM) to the RCs. Data indicated that neither transfer of OPCON nor designation of TACOM are functioning as intended:

a. **OPCON**: Only a minority of PRTs could provide a reference to their ORBAT TOA or other reference transferring OPCON (or any other command description) to NATO. Some nations assigned OPCON for their PRT directly to COMISAF, bypassing the proper route through SACEUR and then JFC Brunssum and thus removing the strategic and rear-operational commanders from the TOA process.

b. **TACOM**: The PRT survey conducted for this analysis revealed that 37% of PRTs claimed no formal command relationship with their RC and none of the respondents correctly regarded their command relationship with the RC as TACOM (Figure 2).

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\(^6\) The PRT ESC is an ambassadorial level body, co-chaired by the Afghan Interior Minister and COMISAF and supported by the PRT Working Group (PRT WG) to provide operational level guidance to PRTs.

\(^7\) This was reported in the ‘Compliance with the ANDS’ section earlier in this chapter.
55. This issue was noted when the first PRT re-flagged to ISAF and appears to continue to be an issue. Two means to improve awareness of formal command relationships are for:

- a. Nations to re-establish TOA on each rotation of PRT, by formal message in accordance with the OPLAN series
- b. JFC Brunssum to issue a formal TASKORG message promulgating the current force elements and their relationships within the ISAF organisation on every ISAF Command rotation or when a significant organisational change occurs.

56. Despite the PRTs’ general lack of awareness of their formal command relationship with their RC, PRTs reported, when asked how much influence different organisations had on them, that RCs had the strongest organisational influence on them (Figure 3 summarises their responses). So it appears that RCs still have an organisational influence on PRTs.

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8 See JALLC Report, Reference AH, and NATO Lessons Learned Database entry number 281.
57. In multiple interviews, PRT leaders, CIMIC SMEs and RC personnel suggested that most PRTs are strongly influenced by their TCN. For instance, some visited PRTs considered themselves as principally national elements and regarded their relationship within ISAF to be political expedience rather than a means to develop theatre-wide coordination and synergy. Yet, only one third of PRTs responding to the PRT questionnaire reported a strong TCN influence and only one of these PRTs reported their RC’s influence to be lower than their TCN’s influence. On average, RCs had the strongest reported influence on PRTs.

58. The difference between the commonly held view regarding the level of TCN influence on PRTs expressed in interviews and the PRT questionnaire results may indicate a misperception by the questionnaire respondents about the extent to which strong TCN influence exists at PRTs. However, it is also possible that PRTs dominated by their TCN were less likely to respond to a NATO questionnaire biasing the result as only responses from PRTs most closely integrated with ISAF were received. If this were the case, one may also expect the questionnaire respondents to have been aware of their formal command relationship with their RC but this was not the case. By this reasoning, one can assume that sample bias did not affect the answers to this question and can conclude that while strong TCN influence is present

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9 Note UNAMA is seen as having little influence on the activities of PRTs, consistent with the lack of harmonisation noted previously.

10 One PRT said in interviews that when the PRT Questionnaire arrived it was ignored, as it was not a national issue. Further, the PRTs that anecdotally are most dominated by their TCN did not respond to the questionnaire.
at some PRTs, strong TCN influence does not appear to be as widespread as many interviewees believe.

59. ISAF unity of command is degraded by problems with formal TOA but this is not associated with reduced strength of ISAF influence at PRTs. The number of PRTs in which strong TCN influence exists appears to be less than many believe.

**USE OF NATO CIS**

60. It was observed that many PRTs maintain a strong link with their nation through the use of national CIS as their primary information technology bearer rather than NATO CIS. In most PRTs, the majority of staff work is conducted outside the NATO CIS. This issue was highlighted in a previous JALLC report (Reference B) but little significant progress seems to have been made since then at the PRT level.

61. A number of factors influencing a PRT’s decision to use national CIS were observed during this study:

   a. PRTs often have limited access to NATO CIS.
   
   b. The bandwidth allocated to the NATO system is too small. One PRT reported a total bandwidth of 580 Kb/s, far below their Information Exchange Requirement (IER).
   
   c. Limited availability of ISAF mission workstations at the PRT means they have to be shared.
   
   d. Transferring files between national and NATO CIS is time consuming and subject to security considerations.
   
   e. The process of changing from national CIS to the NATO mission system (observed at one PRT) is complex as it requires the transfer of a significant amount of data to the NATO system and a major change to the PRT’s methods of working.

62. Lack of use of NATO CIS is also evident at some RCs. HQ ISAF provides information via a comprehensive ISAF WISE Website that is regularly updated and relevant but the RC East website is empty.
PRT Methodologies

63. Coalitions express a collective will to confront the challenge for which they have been established. For some in the Afghan population, the strength of the ISAF coalition is demonstrated by the consistency of ISAF’s approach. A consistent ISAF approach and within that a consistent PRT approach also promotes coherency of purpose and makes it easier for PRTs to interact with each other.

64. Three factors were observed that contribute to lack of a consistent PRT approach:

a. PRTs are not specifically addressed within NATO doctrine.

b. PRT designs are not based on agreed criteria. PRTs were observed to be:
   • Based on either multinational or single TCN basic structures
   • Embedded within a larger manoeuvre force element or formed as a stand-alone unit
   • Dominated by a military lead or more balanced with a civilian lead placed alongside the military commander
   • Located within population centres or placed in positions isolated from communities
   • Named by the town in which they were located or by their provincial title

c. Suitability of CIMIC/PRT personnel to CIMIC/PRT tasks varies considerably.

PRTS WITHIN NATO DOCTRINE

65. NATO CIMIC doctrine is encapsulated in the following principal documents (References V-Z), listed in hierarchically descending order:

   • MC 411/1 NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation
   • AJP-9 CIMIC NATO Doctrine
   • Bi-SC Directive 86-3 CIMIC Capability
   • AM 86-1-1 CIMIC TTPs
   • CIMIC Quick Reference Guide (CQRG)

66. Other NATO doctrinal publications also refer to CIMIC activities, for example, AJP 203.4.1 Peace Support Ops (Reference AA).

67. None of the NATO CIMIC references listed above mentions PRTs in any form; although the higher-level documents – the Bi-SC directive and MC policy, include discussions of the guidelines and factors that are applicable to PRT operations. The only coalition guidance available to PRTs is the ISAF PRT Handbook (Reference M) which is focussed on operations in Afghanistan and therefore cannot be considered as doctrine.

68. The PRT questionnaire asked PRTs which documents they felt had the strongest doctrinal influence on PRT operations. The responses are summarised in Figure 4. 30% of respondents stated that none of the listed publications had a strong influence over their activities. Few PRTs identified a single document that they collectively
considered to be strongly influential. As may be expected, the ISAF PRT Handbook was on average most influential and NATO doctrine was on average least influential.

![Graph: Doctrinal Influences on PRTs](image)

Figure 4: Doctrinal Influences on PRTs.

69. If NATO wishes to promote consistency of PRT approach, it needs all PRTs to work according to the same doctrinal influence. To facilitate this, PRTs should be described in NATO operational level CIMIC doctrine.

70. On a related point, there are no standard NATO definitions for terms Stability, Reconstruction and Development that are often used to describe PRT activities. Discussions between parties involved in Civil-Military relationships show different understandings for their usage. These terms need formal definition if they are to be used to describe PRTs in NATO doctrine11.

**PRT DESIGN**

71. Both the civilian and military leaders interviewed within ISAF and the IO and NGO communities agreed that there is no standard PRT model. They stated that due to the diversity of the environment in which each PRT operates—in terms of topographical, ethnic and security conditions—that a template approach to PRTs is neither desirable nor practicable. CALL, JALLC and ISAF documentation confirm this situation:

- A recent CALL report (Reference E) stated:
  
  "the organisational structures of PRTs in Afghanistan were driven by the availability of military and civilian experts from the sponsoring coalition nation, security and

11 Where used within this report they are ascribed the meanings at Annex D.
b. The JALLC PRT report published in May 2005 (Reference B) found a large disparity between PRTs, based principally upon TCN doctrinal approaches but including variables such as environmental and security considerations.

c. In the ISAF PRT Handbook (Reference M), ISAF describes the PRT organisation as follows:

“The structure of a PRT will be a composite of military and civilian elements. Decisions on the size and nature of each PRT will be a matter primarily for the country providing the core of the PRT (the lead nation) in coordination with contributing states (partner nations) and organisations. Factors within the Province/s such as: the security situation, the status of reconstruction, development, effectiveness of governance institutions, the presence of other IOs and agencies will all play a role in defining the specific manpower and functional expertise required of each PRT.”

72. It was suggested during interviews that PRT design should be capability based. To give an idea of the capabilities any PRT needs, one model of PRT capability requirements—derived from the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), the CALL report (Reference E) and discussions with ISAF and PRTs in theatre—is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Generic PRT capability requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability Area</th>
<th>Key Elements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Group</td>
<td>Military Commander, Civilian Lead, POLAD, DEVAD, Deputy Commander, CSM/CQMS, Cultural Advisor/Lead Interpreter&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>HUMINT, Fusion, Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Life Support, Materiel, Medical (Role 1 minimum), Transport, Maintenance, Fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>ISAF C3S&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Personnel, Information Management, Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liaison Teams</td>
<td>Interpreters, Drivers, Force Protection, Liaison Officers/NCOs, CIMIC/PRT Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>Tactical Operations Centre, Force Protection, Info Ops (including PSYOPS and Media), JTAC, Plans, Meteorological, EOD, C-IED, OA&lt;sup&gt;14&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Cell</td>
<td>Civilian and/or Military experts relevant to each sector of the national development strategy&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;. Representatives from TCN governments and/or NGOs plus UNAMA and IOs/NGOs as applicable and willing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>12</sup> DEVAD – Development Advisor, CSM/CQMS – Company Sergeant Major/Company Quartermaster Sergeant

<sup>13</sup> C3S – Consultation, Command and Control Systems

<sup>14</sup> JTAC – Joint Tactical Air Controller, EOD – Explosive Ordnance Disposal, C-IED – Counter Improvised Explosive Device, OA – Operational Analysis

<sup>15</sup> In the case of ISAF: ANDS
73. One PRT described their view of the ideal relationship between PRT military and civilian capabilities and the stability situation using the diagram in Figure 5:

a. Initially, with low stability in an insecure environment, there would be a small NGO/IO capability, demanding civilian reconstruction/development capability inside the PRT to replace the lack of development expertise provided by NGOs/IOs. There would be a significant military security capability, either entirely within the PRT or from a manoeuvre force, reflecting the security environment.

b. As stability improves NGO/IO ability to access the area would improve so their capability would increase. As long-term development projects commence, more specialist skills would be required and the civilian PRT capability would likely grow. At some point the indigenous security forces would be able to maintain security and the PRT military capability would reduce accordingly.

c. Eventually, the stability situation and development programmes would permit self-sustaining development without the influence of the PRT. At this point the civilian capability of the PRT would begin to decrease, as the IO/NGOs would be able to take over.

d. In the future, the stability and development would become self-sustaining without external influence. The PRT would have reached its end-state and thus it should be disbanded.

Figure 5: Balance of military-civilian capability in a PRT with respect to stability

74. The five sub-sections that follow discuss some observed differences in PRT design.

Multinational or Single TCN Basic Structure

75. Many PRTs are provided by a single donor nation, but others are formed by a lead nation with some capabilities provided to the PRT by other TCNs, in other words multinational. The perceived benefits of each model are:

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16 ‘Stability’ is defined in Annex D.
a. Single nation PRTs benefit from unity of command and common tactical doctrines and TTPs that enable more integration and flexibility.

b. The multinational approach to PRT capabilities allows nations who are unable to provide a complete PRT to contribute towards the coalition activities. A PRT reflects a significant national investment to provide for its capability requirements. An additional benefit of a multinational PRT is that it better reflects the coalitional nature of ISAF. Some PRTs suggested that the local perception of PRTs varied depending upon the contributing nation/s. A PRT contributed by a single powerful country, or a combination of nations, particularly from the same geographical region, was seen as preferable to a PRT provided by a single small nation.

76. It was suggested that if multinational PRTs were to be encouraged, PRTs, which are currently reflected in the CJSOR as a single entry, should be defined by multiple entries representing each of its capability requirements. This would allow nations to contribute parts of a PRT rather than requiring them to contribute an entire unit.

Embedded or Standalone

77. In some cases PRTs are designed with all required capabilities available for their exclusive use—‘standalone’. Other PRTs share capabilities with another unit—‘embedded’. A standalone PRT must provide for all its Force Protection (FP), logistical, intelligence, planning and operational needs. When embedded, many of the support functions (logistics, intelligence and FP) are performed by a larger unit.

78. RC South and RC East are divided into Task Force areas because the high intensity combat operations in these regions require an extra layer of command to focus on segments of the regions. In these areas most PRTs are embedded into the Task Force structure and their TACOM has been delegated to the Provincial Task Force Commanders. These PRTs have military sizes of between 38 and 132. Some of these PRTs are collocated with their embedding unit, away from population centres.

79. RC North and RC West have relatively benign environments. In these regions most PRTs are standalone and their TACOM remains with the RC Commander. These PRTs have military sizes of between 144 and 430.

80. Possible advantages and disadvantages of embedding PRTs were suggested:

a. An advantage of a PRT having a partner unit is that the partner may provide force multipliers to the PRT, capabilities not specifically required from the CJSOR – such as combat engineers or medical facilities that enhance the activities of the PRT. Another advantage may be the ability to rapidly augment the PRT with military to respond to increased threat. During the time spent in theatre collecting data, insurgent activity increased in a province that initially had a benign security environment. In this case, the PRT in that province was deployed by the TCN at fixed company size and did not have sufficient troop numbers available to respond to the increased threat. Another PRT and manoeuvre forces from another RC had to assist to re-establish control. Had the PRT been embedded in a Task Force structure, forces may have been available to augment the PRT’s security capability as required.

b. A disadvantage of a PRT having a partner unit is that both units may have to compromise in order to share resources effectively and to achieve their missions. Another disadvantage of having a partnership is that the PRT may not be optimally located (see Population Centre or Isolated Location para’s 82-84).
Military or civilian leadership

81. The PRT Handbook (Reference M) advises that;

“A PRT must have an integrated command group, composed of senior military and civilian officials.”

It offers no further advice with regard to the nature of command within the PRT.

82. Many of the PRTs have placed the military commander in overall command – including command over the civilian component. CALL recommends such a system based on its study of PRTs manned by personnel from a single nation (Reference E). However, the majority of those interviewed considered an informal yet synergistic relationship with joint civil/military leadership to be more effective at employing the broad base of civilian expertise available under the PRT’s umbrella.

Population Centre or Isolated Location

83. Some PRTs are located at some distance, e.g. 5km, from the nearest town. This decision regarding location is possibly due to the need to collocate with another unit that is providing some supporting capabilities, or for perceived FP benefits.

84. Some PRTs are located within the confines of the town. These PRTs have strong presence and visibility which helps them to generate a better relationship with the population. In the case of one PRT, the local population told the PRT that they were, “seen to be stronger and braver than the Russians”. When asked why, the locals replied that, “the Russians had stayed at the airport while this PRT was situated in the centre of town”. Being based in town also facilitates contact with local leaders and the IO/NGO field staff that tend to have their offices within the local community. A location within a town may bring additional FP requirements but at least one PRT believed that this was outweighed by the benefits. They stated that their location inside the town actually reduced the threat from indirect fire, since they believe opposing militia forces are wary of causing collateral damage within the town.

85. Increasingly PRTs are employing safe houses or satellite PRTs based in population centres throughout their province to gain closer access to the Afghan population. Two perceived benefits and one perceived risk are:

a. Benefit: Safe houses are intended to prevent the perception of a tribal bias that may arise if the PRT focuses its activities in a single part of the province. An example of perceived tribal bias arose in a divided province with one half dominated by Pashtuns and the other by Tajiks. This province’s PRT was located in the Tajik half. Resentment grew from the Pashtuns due to their perception that they were not receiving development aid at the expense of their rivals. Reportedly, opposing militia forces who could offer an alternative version of security, education and financial support were exploiting this disenchantment.

b. Benefit: Safe houses can also be used by PRTs based away from towns to offset their reduced interaction with the population when compared with those in towns.

86. PRTs tend to adopt the name of their base population centre; in many cases (17 of 25) this is not the same as the provincial name and does not reflect their provincial
responsibility. This may be perceived by the local population to indicate a tribal or ethnic bias.

**PRT/CIMIC PERSONNEL**

87. One role of PRTs and CIMIC is to build relationships with the Afghan and NGO/IO civilian communities through Key Leader Engagement (KLE) within these communities. In another role, PRTs provide support to development projects. PRT leadership seniority, tour length and rotations and personnel skills and attributes all contribute to the PRT’s ability to carry out these roles.

**Leadership Seniority**

88. PRT military commanders range in seniority from OF-3 to OF-6. As noted in the JALLC report on Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams in ISAF (Reference AB), when planning KLE strategy it is important to match relative age, experience and status with the person engaged. To plan KLE strategy, most PRTs develop an engagement matrix in accordance with NATO CIMIC TTPs – for example, the civilian and military commanders meet with the Provincial Governor and Chief of Police, the deputy commander with the Ministry representative and district governors, and the CIMIC lead with administrative heads. In general, it appears that OF-5 is the most appropriate rank for the military lead to engage effectively with the Provincial Governor and Chief of Police.

89. Similar considerations apply for the civilian lead. In some cases, this position is staffed with relatively junior personnel who act in an advisory role to the military commander. When the civilian element is led by an experienced diplomat or a specialist developmental advisor, of equivalent grade to the military leader, the civilian lead is better able to participate in mentoring activities with the provincial leadership and discourage the military commander from extending beyond his security mission. It was suggested that a UNAMA representative may be a good choice for civilian lead as it may improve the synergy between PRTs and UNAMA.

**Tour Length and Rotations**

90. The usual deployment lengths for most ISAF military personnel range between four and 15 months. In some cases, PRT personnel are deployed for as little as two months. The tour length of civilians at PRTs tends to be longer, typically double that of their military counterparts.

91. Short tour lengths may encourage a short-term view of development projects. Commanders may wish to see their projects reach fruition during their time in theatre and hence, may give preferential treatment for quick impact projects. The resulting emphasis on short duration, rapid impact projects at the expense of support to long-term development activities has been extensively criticised by NGOs (Reference AC).

92. Additionally, each time the military personnel in a PRT rotate, the continuity of the PRT’s community relationships is disrupted and knowledge is lost. Three ways to improve continuity and reduce knowledge loss at rotation are:

   a. Civilians provide some continuity for the community relationships and update the military newcomers with news about decisions and policies implemented by their predecessors.

   b. Stagger or ‘trickle–rotate’ PRT personnel rather than using the currently predominant Relief-in-Place method that changes all personnel nearly simultaneously.
c. One PRT has created a database of all KLE activity, recording each meeting, its outcome and key themes. This information is available in the TCN via national CIS allowing new personnel in-theatre to focus on the establishment of personal relationships rather than establishing situational awareness.

Skills and Attributes

93. Afghan PRT personnel need skills in cultural understanding and gender issues, the ability to work with and mentor GOA personnel and Afghan community and technical expertise relevant to the delivery of development projects. All PRTs and RCs visited emphasised the need for well-trained CIMIC personnel. As one RC Command Group member stated, when discussing a failed CIMIC activity, in his opinion it was better not to have any personnel rather than poorly trained or unprofessional CIMIC operatives. Discussions with PRT personnel revealed a wide variation in training syllabi and methodologies as well as degrees of applicability to theatre. The range of PRT-specific pre-deployment training varied from none, through to a six-month full time course.

94. Two observations were made regarding training in cultural and gender issues:

a. Personnel receive training from their TCN that is then, to prepare personnel fully for their tasks within ISAF, supplemented by NATO-provided training at the NATO School Oberammergau and in theatre. Due to the variable training experience personnel receive from their TCNs, training provided by NATO is often forced to address basic CIMIC skill sets rather than adding value and addressing theatre and ISAF topics.

b. Training in gender and ethnic issues is limited to that provided by the TCN\textsuperscript{17} and an introduction during the NATO School PRT Course. While most national training reportedly provided some insight into gender and ethnic issues, a majority of PRT commanders stated that this topic proved to be their most significant challenge and much of their knowledge had been gained on the job.

95. Two observations were made regarding ability to work with and mentor GOA and the Afghan community:

a. Some PRT Commanders and staff are interacting with their provincial governmental counterparts without specific training in governance issues and without access to a Political Adviser (POLAD) familiar with the Afghan environment.

b. Many PRTs complained of a lack of female CIMIC personnel and interpreters. While in western culture there is an acceptance of the presence of male personnel when addressing a female audience, this not the case in Afghanistan. Even if a female operative is available, the presence of a male interpreter will preclude engagement with a female group.

96. Finally, examples show how PRT personnel skills and attributes have impacted development projects. In one case, a PRT initiated a project to construct a ‘new city’ to improve the living conditions of the population. Lacking the required expertise, the building work commenced without reference to the required infrastructure – roads and drainage, to support the new buildings. The result was a project that is in severe risk of failure. Other projects that have failed or even had a negative impact on development as a result of a lack of required skills within the PRT are often quoted by NGOs when they criticise PRTs (Reference AC).

\textsuperscript{17} Sometimes entirely nationally-provided or alternatively using other sources such as the NATO affiliated CIMIC CCOE.
This chapter provides a summary of the observations followed by a list of recommendations and JALLC commentary highlighting the areas observed that JALLC has briefed during the course of this analysis and believes are the most important issues arising from this study.

**SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS**

**Cooperation to achieve Afghan goals**
98. Not all ISAF contributors are complying with the ANDS.
99. Some political level development funding mechanisms in use do not support the development of financial systems and governance in GOA.
100. COMISAF does not have quick access to funds for use on urgently needed development projects in support of the ISAF mission.
101. Military-civilian interaction is improving but more can still be done.
102. The relationship between ISAF and UNAMA is not yet mature.
103. The TOA process for PRTs has not been working properly.
104. Many PRTs are not using NATO CIS.

**Consistency of PRT approach**
105. PRTs are not described in NATO doctrine.
106. PRT design varies in terms of:
   a. Multinational or single nation
   b. Embedded or Standalone: TF command or RC command: Low or High military numbers
   c. Population centre or isolated location
   d. Town or province name
107. PRT personnel vary in terms of:
   a. Leadership seniority
   b. Rotation schedule
   c. Specialist skills and personnel attributes

**Other Factors Observed**
108. ISAF is using EBAO when it has not been authorised to do so by SACEUR.
109. The UNDSS Accessibility Map is one potential measure of ISAF mission success.

**SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING FROM THIS ANALYSIS**
110. ISAF should support and enable the ANDS to ensure coherency of military and civilian development activities throughout Afghanistan. (Ch3 Paras 29-31)

111. NATO should seek to develop a commonly agreed development funding methodology that satisfies the needs of the Afghan population but that also allows the development of GOA governance systems under the World Bank’s leadership. (Ch3 Paras 32-35)

112. NATO should provide COMISAF with a source of operational level funding to allow the expeditious resourcing of development activity that has significant bearing upon operational level mission accomplishment. (Ch3 Paras 36-39)

113. The image of PRTs within the aid community needs continued improvement. This can be achieved in three principal ways:

- In a NATO context through the involvement of these organisations in seminars and training events – much as is already occurring.
- At the operational and tactical levels, engagement must be maintained, to include full disclosure of PRT activities and demonstrating a desire to ‘step back’ from projects once a suitable partner has come forward to take over.
- At the tactical level, PRTs must endeavour to enable NGOs as far as possible. Using NGOs to ‘front’ their contacts with the local community is one way of enabling these organisations to gain access to the population while engendering trust between NGO and PRT. (Ch3 Paras 40-46)

114. NATO and ISAF should better enable UNAMA towards the full adoption of its role.

- UNAMA should be encouraged to take over the oversight of the PDC/PDP processes as a priority.
- ISAF should encourage UNAMA to collocate with PRTs where the security situation may prevent the establishment of a separate UNAMA office.
- NATO should encourage UNAMA to establish a coordination element within HQ ISAF.
- ISAF should encourage UNAMA to place liaison officers within PRTs. (Ch3 Paras 47-51)

115. The command relationship between RC and PRT should be formally recognised.

- TOA should be re-established on each rotation of PRT, by formal message in accordance with the OPLAN series.
- JFC Brunssum should consider the periodic release of a TASKORG message confirming the command relationship of force elements within the ISAF mission. This message might be issued on HQ ISAF command rotation or on significant change. (Ch3 Paras 52-58)

116. PRTs should utilise NATO CIS as the primary mission C2 bearer, reserving national systems for Reach Back. (Ch3 Paras 59-61)

117. The concept and best practice of PRT operations should be included in CIMIC operational doctrine and also in COIN or peace enforcement type operation doctrine. (Ch4 Paras 64-68)

118. NATO should develop standard definitions for the terms stability, reconstruction and development – that are consistent with terms used in the IO/NGO communities. (Ch4 Para 69)
119. The balance of civilian versus military capabilities within a PRT needs to be flexible to reflect the security and development environment. (Ch4 Paras 70-72)

120. The CJSOR entry for PRTs should be divided into contributing capabilities to encourage the contribution of force elements rather than the need to develop an entire PRT. (Ch4 Paras 74-75)

121. A decision to partner a PRT with another unit to share capabilities must be carefully considered to prevent an unacceptable compromise that prevents the PRT from conducting its mission effectively. (Ch4 Paras 76-79)

122. PRTs should be jointly led by military and civilian component leads, fostering a synergistic relationship between the security and development roles. (Ch4 Paras 80-81)

123. PRTs should preferably be located within population centres. (Ch4 Paras 82-83)

124. The use of satellite safe houses throughout the PRT’s AOR should be employed to maximise contact with the local population. (Ch4 Para 84)

125. PRTs should use a name that reflects their provincial responsibility. (Ch4 Para 85)

126. Military commanders should be selected at OF-5 level and civilian leaders should be of equivalent seniority. (Ch4 Paras 87-88)

127. TCNs should be encouraged to increase the tour length of PRT personnel. (Ch4 Paras 89-90)

128. Means to improve the transfer of knowledge and expertise across rotations should be investigated – either through the use of technology and/or through the methodology used for rotations. (Ch4 Para 91)
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### Annex C

**Glossary of Acronyms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACBAR</td>
<td>Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief</td>
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<td>ACSP</td>
<td>Afghanistan Country Stability Picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>Afghanistan Information Management System</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<td>ANSO</td>
<td>Afghan NGO Security Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARTF</td>
<td>Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>US Army Center for Lesson Learned</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>CIMIC Fusion Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJETO</td>
<td>Combined Joint Effects Tasking Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJSOR</td>
<td>Combined Joint Statement of Requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil Military Overview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM/CQMS</td>
<td>Company Sergeant Major/Company Quartermaster Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVAD</td>
<td>Development Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBAO</td>
<td>Effects Based Approach to Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Force Protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOA</td>
<td>Government (of the Islamic Republic) of Afghanistan (GIROA)(^1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-ANDS</td>
<td>Interim – Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JALLC</td>
<td>Joint Analysis &amp; Lessons Learned Centre</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Tactical Air Controller</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>Key Leader Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
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<td>OPCODEL</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>Provincial Development Plan</td>
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<td>PET</td>
<td>PRT Engagement Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>POHRF</td>
<td>Post Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Political Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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</table>

\(^1\) GIROA is increasingly replacing the AAP-15 acronym GOA, due to a desire to emphasise that Afghanistan is an Islamic state.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRT ESC</td>
<td>PRT Executive Steering Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRT WG</td>
<td>PRT Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander, Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCR</td>
<td>Senior Civilian Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECGEN</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACOM</td>
<td>Tactical Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Nation</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transfer of Authority</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tactics, Techniques and Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>UNDSS</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Safety and Security</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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# Annex D

## Glossary of Definitions

Definitions of terms in this report are in accordance with AAP-6, with the addition of those below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>The improvement to infrastructures and systems beyond the capability existing prior to conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
<td>The repair and refurbishment of infrastructures and systems damaged by Military Operations to their pre-conflict capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilisation</td>
<td>The process to establish a locally-led and sustainable peace in a dangerous environment(^1).</td>
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\(^1\) Reference U
Annex E
Lessons Identified

The following summary of Lessons Identified forms a list of those issues from the analysis results considered appropriate for inclusion in the NATO Lessons Learned Database (and thus for formal consideration for action at the Bi-SC level as part of the Bi-SC Lessons Learned Process).

LESSON IDENTIFIED 1: COHERENCY OF ISAF CIMIC AND PRT ACTIVITIES WITH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES ACROSS AFGHANISTAN

Observation
Part of ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (AFG) is to provide the security environment needed to promote development. The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is Afghanistan’s strategy to reach the internationally agreed “Millennium goals”. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established with a role to act as the UN’s development coordinator. NATO’s Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activity in ISAF is principally conducted by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The ANDS is intended to harmonise international efforts and UNAMA’s role is to facilitate and oversee development. While this is largely occurring, national priorities, caveats and practices are diverting some PRT effects from the ANDS. Additionally, there is a lack of coherence among nations’ use of funding channels to achieve development.

Discussion
In the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, the international community agreed to support a transitional Afghan government in the development of Afghanistan towards a set of “Millennium Goals”. This agreement was renewed and updated by the Afghan Compact. The associated internationally-endorsed strategy was entitled the Afghan National Development Strategy. In December 2005 an interim version of the ANDS, the ANDS was published. The ANDS is due to be refined to ‘full’ ANDS in 2008. The ANDS is the overarching coherency mechanism for Afghan development applicable to all donors. Its successful implementation is an enabler for NATO’s mission success.

UNAMA is the UN agency tasked to coordinate the international development effort within an environment made secure by ISAF. It was established in March 2006 ‘to manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with the international community’ (Ref 1 in attached report). At present UNAMA lacks capacity to assume its responsibilities fully, due largely to a shortage of personnel and an inability to deploy to areas of high risk. Where UNAMA has established offices in the same areas as PRTs, they have shown indications of positive interaction. One of UNAMA’s roles is to coordinate development at the provincial level, mentoring and enabling developing the Provincial Development Plans (PDP) via the Provincial Development Councils (PDC). In many cases this mentoring role has been conducted by PRTs rather than UNAMA. UNAMA partnership with ISAF has the potential to ensure the effective coordination of military and civilian activities needed for success in Afghanistan.

The PRT Executive Steering Committee, an ambassadorial-level executive body, has been inadequately supported by its subordinate PRT Working Group, in its task to provide operational direction and guidance. These coordinating bodies worked directly with the GOA Ministry of the Interior, but have not achieved the results that were hoped
for. NATO’s Senior Civilian Representative has encouraged donor nations to support
the newly-mandated Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), seen as an
opportunity to re-invigorate the PRT ESC through a more effective PRT WG.

Funding for PRTs from nations currently runs through four routes: 1) the World Bank-
approved Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which centralises funding and uses
nascent GOA agencies to distribute aid 2) directly to the Provincial Governor’s Office 3)
directly to the PRTs and 4) directly to contractors executing aid programmes. Each
has drawbacks associated with applying coherent aid to Afghanistan.

Conclusion
PRT efforts are currently lacking in optimal coherence due to 1) national considerations
diverting efforts away from the intent of the ANDS 2) a lack of UNAMA capability 3) the
lack of progress by the PRT ESC and 4) the variance in funding methods.

Recommendations

ISAF

- ISAF should support and enable the ANDS to ensure coherency of military
  and civilian development activities throughout Afghanistan.
  - PRTs should encourage provincial leadership to comply with the ANDS and
    ensure that local initiatives are consistent with national priorities.
  - All ISAF contributors should that ensure their plans are aligned to the
    ANDS.
  - NATO should seek to develop a commonly agreed development funding
    methodology that satisfies the needs of the Afghan population but that also
    allows the development of GOA governance systems under the World
    Bank’s leadership.
  - ISAF and donor nations should support the initiative to re-establish the PRT
    ESC and its Working Group.

NAC/ISAF

- NATO and ISAF should better enable UNAMA towards the full adoption of
  its role.
  - UNAMA should be encouraged to take over the oversight of the PDC/PDP
    processes as a priority.
  - ISAF should encourage UNAMA to collocate with PRTs where the security
    situation may prevent the establishment of a separate UNAMA office.
  - NATO should encourage UNAMA to establish a coordination element within
    HQ ISAF.
  - ISAF should encourage UNAMA to place liaison officers within PRTs.
  - In future operations requiring support to the development of governmental
    structures, NATO should encourage the production of an indigenously-
    developed, internationally-endorsed strategy that provides a central
    coherence mechanism both for the military and the civilian aid donors.
LESSON IDENTIFIED 2: CONSISTENCY OF ISAF PRT OPERATIONS BETWEEN PROVINCES AND TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS (TCNS)

Observation
There are clear indications of a breakdown of the formal Transfer of Authority (TOA) from the contributing nation to ISAF. Nevertheless, an informal command structure appears to function. The absence of formal TOA coupled with the predominance of use of national CIS over the NATO mission system, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) funding being determined nationally, and an ineffective operational-level PRT Executive Steering Committee (PRT ESC) means PRTs are subject to considerable national influence that is not always consistent with ISAF priorities.

Discussion
COM JFC Brunssum identified that a significant number of PRT leaders were reporting directly to their national ministries with ISAF reporting occurring only ‘by serendipity or pragmatic necessity’ (Ref L of the attached report). SACEUR’s OPLAN (Ref K) requires the transfer of forces from Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) to SACEUR at a minimum of OPCON who in turn delegates this authority to COMISAF via JFC Brunssum. The PRT questionnaire showed that 37% of PRTs did not recognise a formal relationship with their RC and none correctly stated that they were under TACOM to their RC. These findings demonstrate a breakdown in the formal TOA process. The same survey identified an informal command chain that closely mirrored the desired operational design which was proving to be adequate under present circumstances.

The lack of clarity in TOA is exacerbated by nations bypassing the official TOA process, multi-organisational influences on PRTs and the use of national CIS systems over the designated NATO mission system, and an ineffective ISAF PRT coordination mechanism. Organisational influences comprise Afghan provincial and national agencies, the UN, ISAF commands and agencies, and donor national bodies. PRT efforts are coordinated via the PRT ESC, an ambassadorial-level executive body, which has been inadequately supported by its subordinate PRT Working Group, in its task to provide operational direction and guidance.

Conclusion
With the predominance of use of national CIS over the NATO Mission system, PRT funding being determined nationally, and an ineffective ISAF PRT coordination mechanism PRT ESC, PRTs are subject to considerable national influence that is not always consistent with ISAF priorities and PRTs are effectively not fully within ISAF command. While an informal command relationship exists between PRTs and their respective RC, there remains a need to recognise this command chain formally.

Recommendations
SHAPE/Nations
- The command relationship between RC and PRT should be formally recognised.
- TOA should be re-established on each rotation of PRT, by formal message in accordance with the OPLAN series.
- JFC Brunssum should consider the periodic release of a TASKORG message confirming the command relationship of force elements within the
LESSON IDENTIFIED 3: PRT COMPOSITION

Observation
The compositions of some Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are not directly associated with provincial requirements. The civilian/military balance, on occasion, does not reflect the security situation and local development needs. Additionally, the military and civilian leadership of PRTs does not always have the appropriate seniority to optimally conduct Key Leader Engagement (KLE).

Discussion
The military complements of PRTs have been observed to be, in some cases, too large numerically, which can stifle the development of Afghan national security forces. An excessive or unnecessary presence of ISAF military elements can also compromise the security and effectiveness of civilian donors by their implied association with ISAF. In other cases, PRTs with insufficient or incorrectly qualified personnel have been unable to maintain conditions which are sufficiently secure for development. The composition of a PRT needs, therefore to be a subtle, tailored and dynamic mixture of civilian and military staff reflecting the operating environment.

The balance between military and civilian leadership of the PRT should reflect the PRT’s dynamic nature and, as importantly, military and civilian leaders should have sufficient experience and seniority to carry out the KLE elements of PRT work in the community. The optimum rank has been observed to be OF-5 or the civilian equivalent.

The flexibility of PRTs to reflect the varying environmental factors may be facilitated by dividing the current single PRT element of the CJSOR into its constituent capabilities to allow nations to contribute component elements of a PRT rather than having to provide an entire PRT.

PRT flexibility is achieved within RC(S) and RC (E) by embedding PRTs within a taskforce structure. In these regions, the PRTs consist of a relatively small military component dedicated to CIMIC tasks that is augmented with manoeuvre forces from the taskforce principally responsible for security.

However, embedding PRTs with a partner unit can, in some cases, require the PRT to compromise. For instance, the PRT may have to be located out of town with the manoeuvre forces or for FP reasons which reduces their access to the local population.

The use of safe houses or satellite PRTs to increase the exposure of the PRT to the indigenous population is an effective method to increase PRT effectiveness. A balanced presence throughout a province can minimise any apparent tribal or ethnic bias and increase the target population available to the PRT.

PRTs generally adopt the name of the town within, or close to, which it is located. In some cases this is the provincial capital and the names of the capital and the province are the same but mostly this is not the case. Thus many PRTs have names that do not
reflect their provincial responsibility which also can imply bias towards the dominant tribe in the town rather than reflecting the ethnic balance of the province as a whole.

Conclusion
The composition of a PRT should be dynamic and responsive to environmental and task requirements, jointly led by appropriately-ranked civilian and military staff, and itemised by capability in the CJSOR.

Recommendations

SHAPE

- The CJSOR entry for PRTs should be divided into contributing capabilities to encourage the contribution of force elements rather than the need to develop an entire PRT.

ISAF/Nations

- The balance of military-civilian capabilities within a PRT must be regarded as fluid and dynamic reflecting the security, reconstruction and development needs existing at any particular time.
- A decision to partner a PRT with another unit to share capabilities must be carefully considered to prevent an unacceptable compromise that prevents the PRT from conducting its mission effectively.
- PRTs should be jointly led by military and civilian component leads, fostering a synergistic relationship between the security and development roles.
- Military commanders should be selected at OF-5 level and civilian leaders should be of equivalent seniority.
- PRTs should be located within population centres to maximise interaction with the local community.
- The use of satellite ‘safe’ houses should be employed through the PRT’s AOR to maximise contact with the local population and to minimise the possible appearance of tribal bias.
- PRTs should use a name that reflects their provincial responsibility.

LESSON IDENTIFIED 4: CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION

Observation
Interaction between civilian organisations and military components can be enhanced by sharing information and knowledge more effectively. Additionally, coherency between civilian and military development activities can be enhanced by collaboration in planning procedures and liaison with Afghan agencies and the local population. To improve information sharing between these actors, NATO is currently experimenting with the CIMIC Fusion Centre (CFC) and the associated Civil Military Overview (CMO) system in Afghanistan.
Discussion
While IOs/NGOs often require a level of disassociation from ISAF military forces to maintain their impartiality and to protect their personnel from reprisals, they also require ISAF to create a safe and secure environment to conduct their activities. It has been observed that IO and NGO inclusion in PRT planning processes has been mutually beneficial, improving coherency and maintaining a mutual understanding of the security and developmental needs of the population without compromising the need for IO/NGO impartiality.

NATO is conducting an experiment involving creating a reach-back function for CIMIC agencies to resources and expertise of military and civilian organisations, via the CIMIC Fusion Centre (CFC) and the associated Civil Military Overview (CMO). Subject to the success of this ACT-sponsored CFC/CMO experiment; resource planning is required to ensure that the experiment can seamlessly transition into an operational product. The provision of a means to share situational awareness is one area where NATO could provide a significant capability of value to the civilian community that would also provide a key enabler towards mission success in Afghanistan.

Any new NATO system should, however, be regarded as complementary to, and not a replacement for, the Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS)-hosted Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP). The ACSP is an ISAF-produced database of ongoing and completed development projects provided by the GOA, ISAF and civilian donors. Containing over 50,000 records, the database is beginning a process of transition to the GOA where it is planned to reside within the Central Statistics Office under a programme called the AIMS, and hosted on a web-based interface.

Conclusion
The relationship between ISAF and IO/NGOs is most successful where close cooperation in planning, and the sharing of information, has created the conditions of coherent effort. This has been successful in some PRTs without compromising the IO/NGO’s requirement for overt disassociation from military forces. The NATO CFC/CMO concept is showing potential to improve civil-military information sharing in Afghanistan and if successful should be continued; however, it should be considered as complementary to the ACSP.

Recommendations

ISAF/Nations
- ISAF and PRTs must continue to develop working relationships with civilian organisations.
  - Non NATO organisations should continue to be encouraged to participate in conferences, exercises and working groups to further enhance mutual understanding of methodologies and capabilities.
  - The optimum method for information exchange between the military and civilian communities should continue to be investigated.
- The image of PRTs within the aid community needs continued improvement.
  - At the operational and tactical levels, engagement must be maintained, to include full disclosure of PRT activities and demonstrating a desire to ‘step back’ from projects once a suitable partner has come forward to take over.
At the tactical level, PRTs must endeavour to enable NGOs as far as possible. Using NGOs to ‘front’ their contacts with the local community enables these organisations to gain access to the population while engendering trust between NGO and PRT.

ACT

- The methods to enhance and optimise information exchange between the military and civilian communities should continue to be investigated.
  - The CFC and CMO must continue to be regarded as complementary to, and not a replacement for the AIMS-hosted ACSP.
  - Priority needs to be given to ensuring CFC/CMO transitions seamlessly to operational use if it is deemed successful.
  - ISAF and PRTs must continue to develop working relationships with IOs/NGOs.
  - ISAF should continue to strive to include IOs/NGOs within the campaign planning process.
  - PRTs should offer facilities to IOs/NGOs ranging from Force Protection and Situation Awareness, through to accommodation and communications (e.g., telephone and internet). These capabilities should be used to draw the aid community towards the PRT on a ‘no strings’ basis.